War on Terrorism: Self Defense, Operation Enduring Freedom, and the Legality of U.S. Drone Attacks in Pakistan by Shah, Sikander Ahmed
Washington University Global Studies Law Review 
Volume 9 Issue 1 
2010 
War on Terrorism: Self Defense, Operation Enduring Freedom, and 
the Legality of U.S. Drone Attacks in Pakistan 
Sikander Ahmed Shah 
University of Michigan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies 
 Part of the Military, War, and Peace Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sikander Ahmed Shah, War on Terrorism: Self Defense, Operation Enduring Freedom, and the Legality of 
U.S. Drone Attacks in Pakistan, 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 77 (2010), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Global Studies Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
77 
WAR ON TERRORISM: SELF DEFENSE, 
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, AND THE 
LEGALITY OF U.S. DRONE ATTACKS IN 
PAKISTAN 
SIKANDER AHMED SHAH

 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ..................................... 77 
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING THE USE OF FORCE IN SELF 
DEFENSE AND THE U.S. WAR IN AFGHANISTAN ............................... 88 
A. International Law of Self Defense and Terrorism ..................... 88 
B. The Legality of U.S. Attacks on Afghanistan ........................... 101 
II. OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN: ISAF AND OPERATION 
ENDURING FREEDOM ...................................................................... 108 
III. THE LEGALITY OF U.S. DRONE ATTACKS IN PAKISTAN ................... 113 
A. Justifications for the Drone Attacks in Relation to the Right 
of Self Defense ......................................................................... 115 
B. U.S. Drone Attacks in Pakistan and the Customary 
International Law of Self Defense ........................................... 122 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 127 
 
INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Few would deny the fact that Pakistan faces a contemporary existential 
threat.
1
 The writ of the federal government in various parts of the country 
is becoming increasingly non-existent.
2
 The inception of parallel judicial 
systems
3
 coupled with the materialization of accords between the federal 
 
 
  J.D. Cum Laude, University of Michigan Ann Arbor; Assistant Professor of Law and Policy, 
LUMS University, Lahore, Pakistan. Special thanks to Lubna Anwar and Savera Qazi (LL.B. 2011) 
for research assistance. 
 1. See, e.g., FOX News Sunday with Chris Wallace (FOX News Channel television broadcast 
Mar. 29, 2009) (interview by Chris Wallace with Robert Gates, Sec‘y of Def., U.S.), transcript 
available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,511368,00.html; Clinton Cites Al-Qaeda as Key 
Target in Obama Plan, NEWS, Apr. 22, 2009, http://www.thenews.com.pk/updates.asp?id=75615. 
 2. Pakistan: Negotiating Away the Writ of the State, STRATFOR GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE, Feb. 
17, 2009, http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090216_pakistan_negotiating_away_writ_state. 
 3. Khalid Aziz, Op-Ed., Has Waziristan Stabilized?, NEWS, Apr. 14, 2009, http://www.thenews. 
com.pk/editorial_detail.asp?id=117143. 
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government and Pakistan-based Taliban militias responsible for heinous 
crimes and acts of terrorism is alarming.
4
 Equally distressing is the 
determination that these accords are, in actuality, acts of desperation on 
behalf of the government that further dilute effective control over national 
territory.
5
 From a human rights perspective, the government is condoning 
reprehensible and criminal modes of conduct in the heartland of Pakistan 
by bowing down to radicals, who subscribe to a contorted and purist 
version of religious law and belief system. Such outsourcing of judicial 
function, executive authority, and enforcement is in complete 
contravention of the Constitution of Pakistan and classical Shariah 
(Islamic) law.
6
 
There are doctrinal complexities concerning jurisdiction and 
sovereignty in the volatile frontier region of Pakistan that borders 
Afghanistan, as a sizeable parcel of the territory is semi-autonomous as 
affirmed under the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan.
7
 Numerous Pashtun 
tribes retain administrative control of this territory and matters have 
historically been regulated under the Pashtunwali code,
8
 which has been 
affected by the Salafi,
9
 Wahhabi,
10
 and Deobandi
11
 revivalist movements. 
This phenomenon, coupled with a lack of sustainable development, is 
directly responsible for the recent and horrible repression of civilians, the 
perpetuation of intolerance, and the fostering of militancy in the region.  
Historical contingencies are also to blame for the radicalization process 
that has continued unabated in the tribal belt. The Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan during the height of the Cold War turned into a proxy war 
 
 
 4. Zardari Details Swat Peace Deal, BBC NEWS, Feb. 17, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
south_asia/7894581.stm. 
 5. Nasim Zehra, Swat Deal: An Act of Desperation?, NEWS, Feb. 18, 2009, http://www.the 
news.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=163192. 
 6. See Qazis’ Verdict Can’t be Challenged in SC, NEWS, Apr. 16, 2009, http://thenews. 
jang.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=21541. But see Akhtar Amin, Qazi Courts to Work Under High 
Court: NWFP AG, DAILY TIMES, Apr. 22, 2009, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page= 
2009\04\22\story_22-4-2009_pg7_1. See also PAK. CONST. (1973) art. 175. See generally AL-
MAWARDI, THE ORDINANCES OF GOVERNMENT (Wafaa H. Wahba trans., 2006); IBN TAIMIYYA, ON 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW 11–35 (Omar A. Farrukh trans., 1966). 
 7. See PAK. CONST. (1973) arts. 246–247. 
 8. Pashtunwali is the code of conduct and the unwritten customary law of the tribal Pashtun 
community based on the principles of hospitality, honor, and revenge. See NEAMATOLLAH NOJUMI, 
THE RISE OF THE TALIBAN IN AFGHANISTAN: MASS MOBILIZATION, CIVIL WAR, AND THE FUTURE OF 
THE REGION 224 (2002); see MARTIN EWANS, AFGHANISTAN: A NEW HISTORY 5 (2001). 
 9. See YOUSSEF M. CHOUEIRI, ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 37–39 (1990); BEVERLY MILTON-
EDWARDS, ISLAM AND VIOLENCE IN THE MODERN ERA 17 (2006). 
 10. See DAVID BUKAY, FROM MUHAMMAD TO BIN LADEN: RELIGIOUS AND IDEOLOGICAL 
SOURCES OF THE HOMICIDE BOMBERS PHENOMENON 202–05 (2007); see PETER MARSDEN, THE 
TALIBAN: WAR, RELIGION AND THE NEW ORDER IN AFGHANISTAN 73 (1998). 
 11. See MARSDEN, supra note 10, at 79–81. 
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fought between the two world superpowers,
12
 resulting in massive flows of 
money and modern weaponry into Pakistan and Afghanistan without any 
real accountability.
13
 Subsequent to the Soviet war, Afghanistan was 
plagued with incessant civil unrest and turmoil, a constant state of political 
instability, and a complete absence of law and order.
14
 The United States, 
after accomplishing its objective of driving the Soviets out of Afghanistan, 
completely withdrew all support and aid to Afghanistan, and consequently, 
necessary international assistance for development and rebuilding the 
devastated war-torn nation did not materialize.
15
 Afghanistan‘s neighbors 
actively intruded in its internal affairs to pursue their own objectives.
16
 
Such intrusion often proved detrimental for Afghanistan and was primarily 
a product of regional power dynamics. For instance, the Shia community, 
other ethnic minorities, and Persian speakers in Afghanistan enjoyed the 
patronage of Iran,
17
 whereas Pakistan, along with Saudi Arabia, backed the 
majority Pashtun community of Afghanistan.
18
 The Pashtuns primarily 
adhere to a conservative version of the Sunni faith and also compose the 
second largest ethnic group in Pakistan.
19
  
The Pakistani establishment, including its armed forces and 
intelligence agencies, strongly supported conservative Sunni radicals and 
the Taliban movement to gain putative strategic depth through a 
subordinated Afghanistan and by preempting the formation of a hostile 
Indian-Afghanistan consortium.
20
 The Taliban movement was also seen as 
 
 
 12. See generally GEORGE CRILE, CHARLIE WILSON‘S WAR: THE EXTRAORDINARY STORY OF 
THE LARGEST COVERT OPERATION IN HISTORY (2003); Parvez Ahmed, Sacred Violence: Religion and 
Terror: Terror in the Name of Islam-Unholy War, Not Jihad, 39 CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L. 759, 780–81 
(2007–2008). 
 13. See KURT LOHBECK, HOLY WAR, UNHOLY VICTORY: EYEWITNESS TO THE CIA‘S SECRET 
WAR IN AFGHANISTAN 182–90 (1993). 
 14. Id. at 276. 
 15. See Ahmed, supra note 12, at 781.  
 16. LOHBECK, supra note 13, at 276. 
 17. Id. at 275. 
 18. See TALIBAN AND THE AFGHAN TURMOIL: THE ROLE OF USA, PAKISTAN, IRAN, AND CHINA 
82 (Sreedhar et al. eds., 1997); Timur Kocaoğlu, Could Afghanistan Be a Key to Asian Co-operation 
and Security?, 5 PERCEPTIONS 106, 110 (2001), available at http://www.sam.gov.tr/volume5d.php; 
AHMED RASHID, JIHAD: THE RISE OF MILITANT ISLAM IN CENTRAL ASIA 224 (2002); MARSDEN, 
supra note 10, at 53, 145.  
 19. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION AND WAR 1 (Gabriel Palmer-Fernandez ed., 2004); 
HISTORY AND ETHNICITY 233 (Elizabeth Tonkin et al. eds., 1989); Ali Khan, A Civil War: Obama’s 
Gift to Pakistan, Aljazeera.com, June 22, 2009, http://aljazeera.com/news/articles/39/A_civil_war_ 
Obamas_gift_to_Pakistan.html; Ahmed Rashid, Pakistan’s Explicit Pro-Pashtun Policy and Pro-
Taliban Support, ANALYST, June 21, 2000, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/304. 
 20. Steven Simon & Jonathan Stevenson, Afghanistan: How Much Is Enough?, SURVIVAL: 
GLOBAL POLITICS & STRATEGY, Oct.–Nov. 2009, at 47, 48–49 (2009), available at http://www.iiss. 
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a weapon which, if effectively utilized, would bleed India in the troubled 
Kashmir region located a few hundred kilometers from Afghanistan, 
where India was committing grave human rights violations in quelling a 
genuine freedom struggle of independence of the Kashmiri people.
21
 The 
Taliban movement itself was conceived in the frontier regions of Pakistan 
and Afghanistan in mushrooming religious schools originally funded by 
the United States to fight the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
22
 These 
madaris (schools) proved attractive for destitute, impressionable young 
men because they were provided with basic sustenance, but they were also 
unfortunately indoctrinated with fanatical ideologies premised on 
scriptural literalism that transformed many of them into radicals and 
extremists.
23
 
Soon civil war engulfed Afghanistan, and eventually the Taliban 
established effective control over most of the country.
24
 Initially, they 
were welcomed by the majority of Afghans because they were able to 
provide some level of stability and security to the country.
25
 However, this 
regime became increasingly repressive and fascist as it systematically 
violated all norms of universal human rights.
26
 Yet, in effect, the Taliban 
regime was condoned and tolerated by the majority of the international 
community and especially by the United States.
27
 It was only subsequent 
to the events of September 11, 2001, once the United States embarked on 
the War on Terror, that the averred heroic freedom-fighting Mujahedeen, 
credited for defeating the Soviet Union and triggering its disintegration, 
became formally reclassified by the United States and many Western 
nations as an integral component of the global terrorist network and the 
new enemy of the twenty-first century.
28
 
 
 
org/publications/survival/survival-2009/year-2009-issue-5/afghanistan-how-much-is-enough (follow 
―Get full article here‖ hyperlink; then follow ―View Article (PDF)‖ hyperlink). 
 21. See NOJUMI, supra note 8, at 131; see generally Sikander Shah, An In-Depth Analysis of the 
Evolution of Self-Determination Under International Law and the Ensuing Impact on the Kashmiri 
Freedom Struggle, Past and Present, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 29 (2007). 
 22. See generally STEPHEN TANNER, AFGHANISTAN: A MILITARY HISTORY FROM ALEXANDER 
THE GREAT TO THE FALL OF THE TALIBAN 271–87 (2003); see MUSA KHAN JALALZAI, TALIBAN AND 
THE NEW GREAT GAME IN AFGHANISTAN 130–31 (2002); Febe Armanios, Islamic Religious Schools, 
Madrasas: Background, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, Oct. 29, 2003, http://www.policy 
almanac.org/world/archive/madrasas.pdf.  
 23. See NOJUMI, supra note 8, at 122. 
 24. See id. at 121; see generally JALALZAI, supra note 22, at 109–26. 
 25. See MARSDEN, supra note 10, at 115. 
 26. See id. at 115–16. 
 27. AMIN SAIKAL, MODERN AFGHANISTAN: A HISTORY OF STRUGGLE AND SURVIVAL 225 
(2004).  
 28. See id. at 227–30. 
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The advent of the U.S. War on Terror in Afghanistan brought an end to 
the Taliban regime, but not to the movement.
29
 As a consequence, 
Afghanistan returned to a state of anarchy with the authority of the 
American-instituted Afghan government primarily limited to the capital 
city of Kabul.
30
 U.S. and NATO forces have not been successful in 
controlling any part of Afghanistan.
31
 The region has been flooded with 
thousands of radical fighters from Central Asia, the Middle East, and other 
diverse parts of the world that see the region as a religious battlefield and 
cherish the opportunity to battle the West.
32
 Given the porous border 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the United States asserts that many 
such fighters routinely flee into the frontier region of Pakistan where they 
are provided a safe haven by the local tribal communities.
33
 There are also 
claims that many local fighters from the tribal areas of Pakistan engage 
with U.S. forces in Afghanistan.
34
 The veracity of these claims is 
contestable to some, but irrespective of that determination, one thing is for 
certain: the fight against terrorism has spilled into Pakistan.
35
 The outcome 
of this ideological battle between state and non-state actors has resulted in 
more radicalization, civilian deaths, and suffering, and in turn threatens 
fragmentation of a nuclear Pakistan that is also battling an economic 
meltdown, religious fanaticism, sectarian violence, and secessionist 
movements.
36
 The concern therefore, that an implosion of Pakistan 
threatens international peace and security, is a serious one. 
One must analyze the significance and legality of U.S. drone attacks in 
Pakistan in light of these circumstances. It is quite troubling to witness the 
United States consistently use force against and violate the territorial 
 
 
 29. THE TALIBAN AND THE CRISIS OF AFGHANISTAN 9 (Robert D. Crews & Amin Tarzi eds., 
2008). 
 30. NABI MISDAQ, AFGHANISTAN: POLITICAL FRAILTY AND FOREIGN INTERFERENCE 269 
(2006). 
 31. See Room for Debate, How Not to Lose Afghanistan, http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes. 
com/2009/01/26/how-not-to-lose-afghanistan (Jan. 26, 2009, 11:55); NATO or Taliban? Who is 
Winning the War in Afghanistan?, PAKISTAN DEFENCE, Jan. 2, 2009, http://www.defence.pk/forums/ 
pakistans-war/20884-nato-taliban-who-winning-war-afghanistan.html; Mark Tran, Afghanistan 
Strategy Must Change, US Commander McChrystal Says, GUARDIAN, Aug. 31, 2009, http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/31/general-mcchrystal-afghanistan-bull.  
 32. THE TALIBAN AND THE CRISIS OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 29, at 232. 
 33. See id. at 230. 
 34. See id. at 231. 
 35. See Syed Shoaib Hasan, Centre-Stage in the ‘War on Terror’, BBC NEWS, Mar. 31, 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7974520.stm. 
 36. See Jonathan S. Landay, Pakistan at Risk of Split into Islamist Fiefdoms, MIAMI HERALD, 
Apr. 18, 2009, at A14; Situation Dangerous in Pakistan: Holbrooke, DAWN NEWS, Apr. 20, 2009, 
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/situation-dangero
us-in-pakistan-holbrooke--za. 
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sovereignty of a nation that it officially proclaims to be an important ally 
in its declared fight against global terrorism,
37
 especially when the 
Government of Pakistan has explicitly and repeatedly condemned such 
U.S. attacks as a violation of its territorial sovereignty and as a serious 
undermining of its own fight against curbing terrorism emanating from 
Pakistan.
38
  
A diversity of views is presented upon analyzing the reasons behind 
such unilateral acts of aggression committed against Pakistan by U.S. 
forces stationed in a foreign country neighboring Pakistan. Vocal critics of 
U.S. foreign policy maintain, at the risk of oversimplification, that the U.S. 
attacks on Pakistan are consistent with its past policy and practice of 
routinely disregarding norms of international law,
39
 including 
disrespecting the sovereignty of relatively weak nations when in pursuit of 
its varied, vague, and hegemonic objectives.
40
 They also assert that the 
United States has systematically exhibited impatience in having 
grievances and disputes addressed through multilateral paradigms and 
processes that enjoy the support of the international community and are 
based on global consensus while maintaining requisite due process.
41
 For 
these critics, it is troubling that the United States bypassed international 
institutional involvement when it had been directly affected by the events 
of September 11, because this time there was United Nations (―U.N.‖) 
sanction of the U.S. position, and international consensus on a suitable 
course of action was forthcoming.
42
 
 
 
 37. Pakistan Poll Results Victory in War on Terror, Says Bush, DAWN NEWS, Feb. 21, 2008, 
http://www.dawn.com/2008/02/21/top12.htm. 
 38. Zardari Vows to Fight Militants, NEWS, Apr. 7, 2009, http://thenews.jang.com.pk/print3. 
asp?id=21372. 
 39. See generally JOHN. F. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RULE OF LAW IN 
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (2004). 
 40. See id. at 145 (U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983; U.S. support of rebellion of Contras in 
Nicaragua). S. Brian Willson, The Case of Panama: U.S. Continues its Bully Ways as International 
Outlaw (1991), http://www.brianwillson.com/awolpanama.html. 
 41. See generally MURPHY, supra note 39, at 8 (highlighting U.S. withdrawal from International 
Court of Justice proceedings after losing in the jurisdictional phase of Nicaragua v. United States). See 
Statement by H.E. Mr. Percy M. Mangoaela, Permanent Representative of Lesotho to the United 
Nations, Before the Plenary of the Fifty-fifth Session of the General Assembly, Oct. 26, 2000, 
http://www.un.int/lesotho/s_1026_0.htm (―[T]he ICJ continues to enjoy universal support and respect, 
hence a noticeable increase in the number of cases being referred to it.‖). 
 42. U.S. attacks on Afghanistan were carried out on the basis of self defense when authorization 
of the use of force was forthcoming under the collective security system of the U.N. under article 42 of 
the Charter. See generally TARCISIO GAZZINI, THE CHANGING RULES ON THE USE OF FORCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 77 (2005); see James Saura, Some Remarks on the Use of Force Against 
Terrorism in Contemporary International Law and the Role of the Security Council, 26 LOY. L.A. 
INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 7, 29 (2003) (concluding that ―we have lost an opportunity to renew the 
international commitment to the creation of a new world order based on international law‖); see also 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss1/4
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For critics, the status of the United States as a hyper power has allowed 
it to consider itself as not effectively constrained by or subject to rules of 
international law, even when it has historically enjoyed a preferential 
status both legally and in practice within international governmental 
systems.
43
 The United States, however, mandates that other nations be 
bound by the same norms of international law that it routinely violates.
44
 
This approach undermines the role and effectiveness of important 
multilateral systems both in the short and long term.
45
 Critics maintain that 
U.S. foreign policy is, broadly speaking, blindly driven by a dangerous 
interplay of self-interest and short term objectives that encourages it to act 
paternalistically and also to unwarrantedly intrude into the domestic affairs 
of foreign nations.
46
 These unholy alliances between the United States and 
foreign governments eventually give birth to mutual mistrust and may 
bring about radical regime changes or even ignite revolutions.
47
 
Frequently, U.S. allies transform into foes, or at the very best, the United 
States is dissatisfied with the performance of these governments and their 
inability to deliver on its mandate.
48
 U.S. transgressions of international 
law in the form of reprisals are often a result of such processes taking a 
turn for the worse and are thus a consequence of its own creation. These 
observations are substantiated with regard to the use of force when the 
United States acts either preemptively or in the form of reprisals against 
governments or other actors who were created or supported by the United 
States, not far in the distant past, for the pursuit of ulterior motives.
49
 
 
 
Eric P. J. Myjer & Nigel D. White, The Twin Towers Attack: An Unlimited Right to Self Defense?, 7 J. 
CONFLICT & SEC. L. 5, 16 (2002).  
 43. MURPHY, supra note 39, at 3, 7 (outlining the United States‘ absolute unwillingness to have 
its soldiers and citizens subjected to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court). 
 44. See CHRISTIAN GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 230–31 (3d ed. 2008). 
 45. See id. at 301–02 (explaining that U.S. reluctance to accept and submit to U.N. command 
undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of U.N. operations). 
 46. MAURICIO SOLAÚN, U.S. INTERVENTION AND REGIME CHANGE IN NICARAGUA 14–15 
(2005). See Sepehr Shahshahani, Politics Under the Cover of Law: Can International Law Help 
Resolve the Iran Nuclear Crisis?, 25 B.U. INT‘L L.J. 369, 403 (2007). 
 47. See Shahshahani, supra note 46, at 403–04. 
 48. Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, Patriotism, Nationalism, and the War on Terror: A 
Mild Plea in Avoidance, 56 FLA. L. REV. 933, 973–84 (2004). 
 49. Id. at 962–67; William H. Taft IV & Todd F. Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq, and International 
Law, 97 AM. J. INT‘L L. 557, 563 (2003) (essay by the State Department Legal Adviser and his 
assistant basing the legality of the invasion upon Security Council resolutions, while at the same time 
stating that ―a principal objective‖ of coalition forces in the context of those resolutions was to 
preempt Iraq‘s possession and use of weapons of mass destruction); President George W. Bush, 
Nationwide Televised Address (Mar. 17, 2008), transcript available at Bush: ‘Leave Iraq Within 48 
Hours’, CNN NEWS, Mar. 17, 2003, http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/17/sprj.irq.bush. 
transcript (―The United States of America has the sovereign authority to use force in assuring its own 
national security.‖).  
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Conversely, many supporters of such U.S. foreign policy pursue a 
short-sighted approach when analyzing international relations. Rather than 
determining the root causes of certain global anathemas and then 
postulating a workable solution, their approach is centered on addressing 
symptoms, occasionally by condoning the inappropriate use of force 
against perceived transgressors, and not adequately factoring in the 
resulting adverse ramifications. For many of them, the United States is 
justified and must act as a bulwark to preserve liberal values that are 
globally threatened by the scourge of international terrorism at all costs.
50
 
In progression of this view these supporters of U.S. foreign policy see the 
drone attacks on Pakistan as completely justified because they perceive the 
Pakistani Government as unable to constrain a global terrorist threat 
emanating from within its borders, either because of a lack of 
determination or inability.
51
 Interestingly, many states historically hostile 
to Pakistan, like India, also support this hawkish position for different 
strategic interests.
52
 
To an extent, U.S. drone attacks on Pakistan substantiate the claim that 
the United States is hesitant to rely on other states in fulfilling 
commitments that promote U.S. objectives. It also supports the assertion 
that the United States is not constrained to respecting the sovereignty of 
weaker states when it feels a moderate need to act.
53
 However, a closer 
inspection of the issue does highlight a more convoluted state of affairs. 
There is some truth to the assertion that the United States and Pakistan 
might be fighting two completely different wars. Following the events of 
September 11, Pakistan, under intense U.S. pressure, had no real choice 
but to assure the United States of unstinted support in the War on Terror 
 
 
 50. Maxwell O. Chibundu, For God, For Country, For Universalism: Sovereignty as Solidarity 
in Our Age of Terror, 56 FLA. L. REV. 883, 909 (2004); John McCain, The Road to Baghdad, TIME, 
Sept. 9, 2002, at 107. But see Rasul Bakhsh Rais, Under Foreign Influence, DAILY TIMES (Lahore, 
Pakistan), Sept. 4, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\ 
09\04\story_4-9-2007_pg3_2.  
 51. Aryn Baker, US Stepping Up Operations in Pakistan, TIME, Sept. 17, 2008, http://www. 
time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1840383,00.html. 
 52. Hasan-Askari Rizvi, Editorial, Terrorism and India’s Expanded Agenda, DAILY TIMES 
(Lahore, Pakistan), Jan. 11, 2009, at A61, available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? 
page=2009%5C01%5C11%5Cstory_11-1-2009_pg3_2 (―At the international level, India is using the 
global consensus on counter-terrorism to advance its broader foreign policy agenda of maligning 
Pakistan as an irresponsible state and isolating it.‖). 
 53. See Steve Holland, Tough Talk on Pakistan from U.S. Democrat Obama, REUTERS, Aug. 7, 
2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSN0132206420070801 (―Obama said if 
elected in November 2008 he would be willing to attack inside Pakistan with or without approval from 
the Pakistani government . . . .‖).  
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panning out in Afghanistan.
54
 However, when the Pakistan army was 
forced to act against tribal militias within its own borders in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (―FATA‖), under U.S. directives, it found itself 
fighting an unpopular war against a segment of its own population.
55
 This 
course of action was directly fomenting insurgency and civil unrest within 
its borders and was overwhelmingly opposed by most segments of 
Pakistani society.
56
  
Until recently, the Pakistan Army had denied the involvement of 
FATA tribesmen and, to a limited extent, local Taliban operating from 
within its tribal belt as complicit in international terrorism.
57
 Recently, 
however, local Taliban militias have actively carried out acts of domestic 
terrorism in previously secure centers of Pakistan, in claimed retaliation to 
U.S. drone attacks.
58
 The Pakistan Government is aware that public 
sentiment in the nation overwhelmingly supports a peaceful and negotiated 
settlement to the hostilities playing out in FATA.
59
 The establishment sees 
 
 
 54. AHMED RASHID, DESCENT INTO CHAOS: THE UNITED STATES AND THE FAILURE OF NATION 
BUILDING IN PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, AND CENTRAL ASIA 28–32 (2008); see GRAY, supra note 44, 
at 112. 
 55. Frontline (PBS television broadcast July 20, 2006) (interview with Steve Coll, 
Correspondent for The New Yorker), partial transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ 
frontline/taliban/interviews/coll.html (―[W]hen the Pakistan army is fighting the Taliban, they‘re 
fighting cousins . . . .‖). See also Pamela Constable, The Taliban Tightens Hold in Pakistan’s Swat 
Region, WASH. POST, May 5, 2009, at A1, A8. 
 56. Omar Waraich, Time and Money Running Out for Pakistan, TIME, Oct. 25, 2008, http:// 
www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1852847,00.html. 
 57. RASHID, supra note 54, at 269. 
 58. Lahore ‘Was Pakistan Taliban Op,’ BBC NEWS, Mar. 31, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
south_asia/7973540.stm [hereinafter Lahore]. 
 59. However, recently, the Federal Government has ordered the Armed Forces of Pakistan to 
neutralize the local Taliban based out of the Swat Valley in the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas 
(―PATA‖). Pakistan Army Steps Up Swat Offensive, VOA NEWS, May 8, 2009, http://www1. 
voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-05-07-voa54-68688002.html. The armed forces are carrying out 
a massive armed operation to achieve this objective and presently such use of force enjoys the 
overwhelming support of the populace. Ashfaq Yusufzai, PAKISTAN: Local Residents Tacitly 
Approve of Swat Killing, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Oct. 1, 2009, http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp? 
idnews=48675; Masud Khan, Military Operation in Swat, PAK INST. FOR PEACE STUD., May 27, 2009, 
at 2, available at http://san-pips.com/download.php?f=12.pdf; Most of Pakistani Political Parties 
Support Swat Military Operation, GlobalSecurity.org, May 18, 2009, http://www.globalsecurity. 
org/wmd/library/news/pakistan/2009/pakistan-090518-irna01.htm. Seemingly, there are reasons why 
there is a divergence in the Government‘s approach and popular support for an armed solution in 
regions of PATA and not in FATA. PATA enjoys a somewhat different status under the nation‘s 
Constitution. See PAK. CONST. (1973) arts. 246–247. The Malakand division of PATA, where such 
operations are underway also lies within the heartland of Pakistan and is proximately located a few 
miles away from the capital of the country and other city centers of Pakistan, unlike the far-fetched 
FATA border region. Amir Zia, Recipe for Disaster, NEWSLINE, May 29, 2009, http://newsline. 
com.pk/NewsMay2009/cover4may2009.htm. Thus, even though many in the Pakistani establishment 
are willing to tolerate and even promote extremists and armed radicals for strategic reasons, such as to 
bleed India or exert influence over Afghanistan, they are not willing to let such movements threaten 
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its present role in the U.S. War on Terror as fueling unsought 
radicalization and fundamentalism in Pakistan, and that terrorism within 
Pakistan is actually a consequence of U.S. actions in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan
60
 and the proxy war fought between the United States and non-
state actors, who are primarily foreign terrorists belonging to al-Qaeda and 
other similar outfits.
61
 The establishment in Pakistan realizes that foreign 
extremists with links to al-Qaeda have been provided with sanctuary in 
areas of FATA by local Taliban and other extremist groups or tribesmen 
who were lucratively paid on the condition of providing such services.
62
 It, 
however, still maintains that such assistance, if systematically provided by 
members of the local tribal community, was mostly unwitting and without 
realization of its wrongfulness.
63
  
Many in Pakistan see foreign extremists as exploiting their own status 
as Muslims and the local customs and traditions of the Pashtunwali code 
of hospitality and sanctuary to gain protection in the tribal region.
64
 For 
them, foreign extremists have been highly successful in presenting an 
ideological and civilizational divide that vilifies the United States and the 
West by pointing to a biased U.S. foreign policy that consistently 
undermines the Muslim Community (Ummah).
65
 Relentless drone attacks 
carried out by the United States in FATA, which have killed scores of 
 
 
the Pakistani heartland itself. Nahal Toosi & Asif Shahzad, Strife Threatens Pakistan Peace, BOSTON 
GLOBE, May 4, 2009, http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2009/05/04/strife_threatens_ 
pakistan_peace. Furthermore, Swati Taliban are viewed by most Pakistanis as miscreants who 
systemically violate the penal code, whereas the troubles of FATA are seen as stemming from political 
discrepancies that have extra-judicial or extra-constitutional undertones which can be most effectively 
addressed through political compromise and dialogue. Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA, 
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, Oct. 21, 2009, http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/ 
south_asia/178_pakistan___countering_militancy_in_fata.pdf. According to the author, however, most 
of these distinctions or justifications are illusory in nature.  
 60. Lahore, supra note 58. 
 61. RASHID, supra note 54, at 265. 
 62. Id. at 148. 
 63. See id. at 265 (―The tribes on both sides of the border . . . adhere to Pashtunwali, the tribal 
code of honor and behavior, which includes melmastia, or hospitality, nanwati, the notion that 
hospitality can never be denied to a fugitive . . . .‖). 
 64. Id.; see also Aryn Baker, Dangerous Ground, TIME ASIA, July 10, 2008, at 26, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1821495-3,00.html (―In May C.I.A. Director 
Michael Hayden called the FATA an al-Qaeda ‗safe haven‘ . . . .‖); Pakistan: Cultivating Locals in the 
Jihadist Struggle, STRATFOR GLOBAL, Sept. 19, 2008, http://www.stratfor.com/ analysis/20080919_ 
pakistan_cultivating_locals_jihadist_struggle_0 (―The Taliban movement in Pakistan‘s northwest, like 
its Afghan counterpart, derives much of its support and operational security from local populations. 
This support often allows Taliban militants to blend in with the crowd when they are being pursued by 
Pakistani police or military.‖). 
 65. See Posting of Robert Mackey to The Lede: The New York Times News Blog, http://thelede. 
blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/14/pakistans-daily-show-diplomacy/?apage=2 (May 14, 2009) (―[T]he rise 
of the Taliban [is] a result of U.S. foreign policy in the region in previous decades.‖). 
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innocent civilians, including women and children, are presented as proof 
to substantiate such claims by foreign extremists.
66
 In reality, the United 
States is bombing such areas, albeit quite recklessly, with the aim to 
neutralize the same foreign extremists or Taliban membership.
67
 
The overwhelming majority of Pakistanis correctly do not perceive the 
indigenous tribal communities of FATA as complicit in the original 
attacks of September 11 in the United States.
68
 Many also do not subscribe 
to the view of them being involved in international terrorism per se.
69
 For 
most Pakistanis, U.S. drone attacks on Pakistani soil are continuing as 
futile acts of reprisals in response to the September 11
 
attacks nearly a 
decade ago, which rather than eradicating the threat of global terrorism, 
will increase it further.
70
 For them, such armed aggression perpetuates 
insurgency and also gives insurgents a perfunctory reason to defy the writ 
of the government—the mantra that the government is unable to provide 
protection to the people of the region against an aggressor United States 
that attacks civilians with impunity.
71
 Furthermore, the defenselessness of 
the Pakistani government against U.S. armed attacks bolsters the morale of 
the extremists as proof of the government‘s inability to move against them 
 
 
 66. Jonathan S. Landay, Do U.S. Drones Kill Pakistani Extremists or Recruit Them?, 
MCCLATCHY WASH. BUREAU, Oct. 5, 2009, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/251/v-print/story/65682. 
html; see Counterproductive Drone Attacks, DAILY MAIL, Feb. 3, 2009, http://www.dailymail 
news.com/200902/03/dmeditorialpage.html; TARIQ ALI, THE DUEL PAKISTAN ON THE FLIGHT PATH 
OF AMERICAN POWER 242 (2008) (―[T]he largest pool of recruits . . . has been ―communities 
antagonized by the local authorities and security forces. . . . [T]he Taliban themselves have claimed 
that families driven into refugee camps by indiscriminate U.S. airpower attacks on the villages have 
been the major source of recruits.‖). 
 67. Pakistan Taliban Hideout Hit in ‘U.S. Drone Attack’, GUARDIAN, Apr. 1, 2009, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/01/pakistan-missile-strike-taliban; Pakistan: Cultivating 
Locals in the Jihadist Struggle, supra note 64 (―This has opened up an opportunity for the United 
States to increase the number of unilateral U.S. operations in Pakistan, which has led to civilian 
deaths—only helping the insurgency gain support.‖).  
 68. Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, The FBI Releases 19 Photographs of 
Individuals Believed to be the Hijackers of the Four Airliners that Crashed on September 11, 01 (Sept. 
27, 2001), available at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel01/092701hjpic.htm. 
 69. Pir Khalid, The Victims of ‘Great Game’, ONLINE NEWS, http://www.onlinenews.com.pk/ 
details.php?id=51317 (last visited Nov. 19, 2009). 
 70. Pakistani Taliban Chief Claims U.S. Shooting, REUTERS, Apr. 4, 2009, http://www.reuters. 
com/article/newsOne/idUSTRE5330H420090404; Alamgir Bhittani, Baitullah Claims Responsibility 
for Manawan Attack, DAWN NEWS, Mar. 31, 2009, http://www.dawn.com/ wps/wcm/connect/dawn-
content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/attack-on-police-academy-leaves-8-dead--150-injured--il. 
 71. Islamabad Urged to Concede Its ‘Tacit Approval’ of Drones, DAWN NEWS, July 10, 2009, 
http://www.dawnnews.tv/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/world/14-islamabad-u
rged-to-concede-its-tacit-approval-of-drone-attacks-zj-02 (―Official Pakistani sources say that since 
2006, the drones have killed only 14 militants and over 700 civilians.‖); Jay Solomon et al., U.S. Plans 
New Drone Attacks in Pakistan, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2009, at 3, available at http://online. 
wsj.com/article/SB123803414843244161.html (―concern in Islamabad that such strikes will greatly 
increase the numbers of civilian casualties and further fuel unrest‖). 
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effectively. This realization provides impetus to the extremists to become 
more belligerent in their armed struggle.
72
 
Undoubtedly the frontier region of Pakistan and Afghanistan is fraught 
with complexities and is affected by both regional and international 
politics, religion, culture, and tradition, among other things. Furthermore, 
there is no question that international terrorism, whether in the form of 
state action or non-state action, poses a threat to international peace and 
security.
73
 Global terrorism presents a highly convoluted situation and its 
resolution, however possible, is even more so. The scope of this work, 
however, is limited to outlining the international law governing the use of 
force in self defense before determining the legality of the U.S. attacks on 
Afghanistan and the continued occupation by the United States of the 
nation under Operation Enduring Freedom. It then moves on to answer the 
important question of whether U.S. drone attacks on Pakistani soil to 
eliminate terrorism under the guise of Operation Enduring Freedom are 
legal under the international law of self defense. 
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING THE USE OF FORCE IN SELF DEFENSE 
AND THE U.S. WAR IN AFGHANISTAN 
A. International Law of Self Defense and Terrorism 
A copious amount of discourse has been generated by international law 
scholars in determining the legality of U.S. actions under Operation 
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq. 
However, most Western scholars agree that the United States‘ use of force 
in Afghanistan, in response to the attacks of September 11 on the basis of 
self defense, was legal.
74
 For some, the grave nature of the September 11 
 
 
 72.  
―They are demonstrating that the government of Pakistan is totally ineffective,‖ said Tariq 
Fatmi, a former Pakistani Ambassador to the United States. ―It is further strengthening the 
extremist sentiments in Pakistan. And of course providing a lot of ammunition for those who 
would like to place America in the dog house, who want to ascribe all sorts of evil intentions 
to the United States.‖ 
Nick Schifrin, Pakistan Urges Obama to Halt Drones, ABC NEWS, Jan. 24, 2009, http://abcnews.go. 
com/International/Inauguration/Story?id=6724182&page=1.  
 73. ROBERT P. BARNIDGE JR., NON-STATE ACTORS AND TERRORISM: APPLYING THE LAW OF 
STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE DUE DILIGENCE PRINCIPLE 130 (2008); S.C. Res. 57/1440, ¶ 1, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1440 (Oct. 24, 2002) (condemning ―in the strongest terms the heinous act of taking 
hostages in Moscow, the Russian Federation, on 23 October 2002, as well as other recent terrorist acts 
in various countries, and regard[ing] such acts, like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to 
international peace and security‖). 
 74. See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF DEFENCE 237 (2005). But see 
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attacks radically altered the use of force paradigm of international law in 
light of the presence of global terrorism undertaken by elaborate non-state 
actor-based networks, which resulted in the formation of instant customary 
international law.
75
 Some believe this justified states to unilaterally attack 
and violate the sovereignty of particular nations where these networks 
were perceived to be thriving, both in the form of anticipatory and 
preemptive self defense even when there existed no immediate need to 
carry out these attacks.
76
 Other academics view international law 
governing the use of force as a set of dynamic principles founded at the 
inception of the U.N. Charter that have been transformed and broadened 
relative to the need of the hour.
77
 Yet other scholars do not recognize any 
alteration in the law of self defense, but have re-interpreted the concepts 
defining self defense and its limits in a constructed manner that 
synthetically justifies U.S. attacks.
78
  
The author views all of these approaches critically. Customary 
international law, defined in tandem with the legal framework governing 
the use of force formalized under the U.N. Charter, is still in force and has 
not undergone any material change.
79
 The narrow confines, on the basis of 
which the right of self defense can be exercised under article 51 of the 
U.N. Charter, legally prevail and any dilation of its contours is 
inadvisable.
80
 These factual and legal determinations can be ascertained 
from all sources of international law, as will be subsequently elucidated. 
From an international relations and policy perspective, adopting such a 
conservative approach is quintessential for purposes of maintaining 
international peace and security. Forced acquiescence to an expansive 
right of self defense relative to global terrorism has dangerously allowed 
some powerful states an excuse to unilaterally and preemptively attack 
relatively weaker states illegally.
81
 Other states have brutally suppressed 
the right of internal self-determination and civil rights on the pretext of 
terrorism.
82
  
 
 
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 476 (2005). 
 75. CASSESE, supra note 74, at 475. The author refutes this assertion.  
 76. See id. at 476 (outlining such action as illegal armed reprisals). 
 77. See Steven R. Ratner, Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello After September 11, 96 AM. J. INT‘L L. 
905 (2002). 
 78. See Michael Byers, Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law After September 11, 
51 INT‘L & COMP. L.Q. 401 (2002). 
 79. See generally GRAY, supra note 44, at 118. 
 80. See Myjer & White, supra note 42, at 17.  
 81. See GRAY, supra note 44, at 218. 
 82. See generally Shah, supra note 21. 
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Alarmingly, what has been witnessed is the development of the Bush 
Doctrine
83
 and the successive U.S. National Security Strategies, both of 
which prompt the United States to preemptively attack other states on the 
basis of vague parameters.
84
 Such developments most directly undermine 
the legitimacy of the Security Council (―S.C.‖), which the majority of 
developing and Muslim nations alike increasingly view as primarily 
supportive of neo-colonial agendas.
85
 Without any permanent 
representation in the S.C., these countries frequently have their grievances 
blocked by veto, leaving the overall resentment of the population within 
such states extremely high.
86
 This divide is widening with the realization 
within the global community of states that many permanent members of 
the S.C. act unilaterally in contravention of multilateral systems when 
their own vested interests, or those of their important allies, are at stake.  
Historically, before the development of the U.N. Charter, the right of 
self defense was construed quite broadly. This determination can be 
gauged from historical state practice.
87
 For instance, numerous states used 
force preemptively, and their actions were generally accepted and 
considered legal by the world community.
88
 In the aftermath of World War 
II and the magnitude of the devastation caused, the U.N. Charter was 
formulated to clearly reflect altered customary international norms 
 
 
 83. The United States, in putting forward a new ―Bush Doctrine,‖ has extended the right of self 
defense far beyond its traditional scope. The United States has indicated that ―force may be used even 
where there has been no actual attack, purely in order to pre-empt future, even non-imminent, attacks.‖ 
GRAY, supra note 44, at 209–10.  
President Bush‘s doctrine on ‗preventive war‘, as spelled out in the 2002 National Security 
Strategy of the United States, is in reality a new and expanded interpretation of the notion of 
imminence of armed attack, which affords new possibilities to react in self-defence. In the 
Presidential document, the new threats are constituted by the possession of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) by States ready to use them and by terrorist movements. Deterrence does 
not work against the new threats.  
Ronzitti, infra note 98, at 347–48. 
 84. See GRAY, supra note 44, at 209–16. 
 85. The United Nations: An Organ for World Democracy, or Imperial Hangover? (Nov. 2002), 
http://india_resource.tripod.com/UN.html. 
 86. Indonesia Calls for Muslim Representation on Security Council, UN NEWS CENTRE, Sept. 
28, 2008, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=28334&Cr=general+assembly&Cr1=deb 
ate#; US Has Vetoed Dozens of UN Security Council Resolutions to Shield Israel from Criticism, 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=28334&Cr=general+assembly&Cr1=debate# (Sept. 
27, 2008, 05:01 PKT); see The United Nations Security Council and the Christian Monopoly, ISLAMIC 
HISTORY AND RESEARCH COUNCIL OF INDIA, May 23, 2006, http://www.ihrcindia.com/index2.php? 
option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=17. 
 87. Sikander Ahmed Shah, The U.S. Attacks on Afghanistan: An Act of Self-Defense Under 
Article 51?, 6 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 153, 160–62 (2007).  
 88. Id. (highlighting, as a valid exercise of self defense as viewed by the world community, 
Britain‘s destruction of the Oran fleet of the Vichy French Government to prevent it from falling into 
the hands of the Germans and potentially being used against Britain).  
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prohibiting a state from threatening or using force, unless it was solely to 
exercise the inherent right of self defense.
89
 Under article 2, section 4 of 
the U.N. Charter, states are to ―refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations.‖90 Exceptions to this rule are narrowly 
confined. For instance, article 51 of the U.N. Charter sanctions an interim, 
but inherent, right to use force if necessary for self defense, but requires 
immediate notice of all actions to the S.C. and termination of actions as 
soon as the S.C. takes measures necessary to maintain international peace 
and security.
91
 
A state can only exercise its right to use force in self defense under 
article 51 if an ―armed attack occurs‖ against it.92 As an actual armed 
attack has to be carried out,
93
 the right to attack another state on the basis 
of anticipatory or preemptive self defense is not available under the U.N. 
Charter.
94
 This conclusion admittedly raises difficult theoretical and 
practical questions in current times when states possess sophisticated 
missile technology and nuclear weaponry. In the Case Concerning Oil 
Platforms,
95
 the International Court of Justice (―I.C.J.‖) clearly required 
that a state that justifies its use of force on the basis of self defense has the 
burden of proving the existence of an armed attack.
96
 Furthermore, when 
an armed attack has come to an end, an attacked state cannot retaliate by 
 
 
 89. However, the Kellogg–Briand Pact of 1928 General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an 
Instrument of National Policy (Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris), 1928, 94 L.N.T.S. 57, did severely 
constrain the lawful conduct of war. See DINSTEIN, supra note 74, at 83.  
 90. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
 91. U.N. Charter art. 51. Legitimate uses of force are available if the Security Council mandates 
such action under article 42 of the U.N. Charter as an instance of collective security to maintain or 
restore international peace and under article 53 and article 107 of the U.N. Charter which relate to 
World War II-specific interstate use of force. 
 92. U.N. Charter art. 51; Shah, supra note 87, at 160–62; see Michael Bothe, Terrorism and the 
Legality of Pre-emptive Force, 14 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 227, 228–30 (2003). 
 93. See DINSTEIN, supra note 74, at 182, 184. 
 94. But see Niaz A. Shah, Self-Defence, Anticipatory Self-Defence and Pre-emption: 
International Law’s Response to Terrorism, 12 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 95, 100 (2007) (―I do not agree 
with a construction of the United Nations Charter which would read article 51 as if it were worded: 
‗Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence 
if, and only if, an armed attack occurs . . .‘ I do not agree that the terms or intent of article 51 eliminate 
the right of self-defence under customary international law, or confine its entire scope to the express 
terms of article 51.‖ (quoting the dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel in Military and Paramilitary 
Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27))). See generally Sean D. Murphy, The Doctrine of 
Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL. L. REV. 699 (2005). 
 95. Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.) (―Oil Platforms‖), 2003 I.C.J. (Nov. 6), 42 
I.L.M. 1334, 1356. 
 96. Id. 
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using armed force because such a response would then qualify as an 
unlawful reprisal under international law, as evinced by numerous General 
Assembly (―G.A.‖) resolutions,97 S.C. resolutions,98 and I.C.J. 
judgments.
99
 This line of reasoning comports with the customary 
international law of self defense under which a state cannot use force in 
self defense when there is no immediacy or imminence requiring using 
such force.
100
  
Post-World War II, a few States have used force against other states 
both in response to perceived past attacks and to deter future attacks based 
on anticipatory and preemptive self defense.
101
 Justifications presented for 
such uses of force refer to conventional threats from enemy states
102
 and 
terrorist threats emanating from both state and non-state actors.
103
 
However, the international community of states has not been receptive to 
such justifications.
104
  
Unfortunately, subsequent to the attacks of September 11, 2001, some 
of these states have acted opportunistically and have increased the 
frequency and intensity of such illegal uses of force, in the form of both 
anticipatory and preemptive attacks, on the premise of fighting global 
terrorism.
105
  
While claiming to act in self defense, these states argue that they fulfill 
the requirements of customary international law in order to derive from the 
law their authority to undertake such preventive actions. The three 
requirements of immediacy, necessity, and proportionality relative to self 
defense were famously outlined in the 1837 Caroline incident by U.S. 
Secretary of State Daniel Webster during the exchange of diplomatic notes 
 
 
 97. See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 
(XXV), ¶ 122, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (Dec. 17, 1970) [hereinafter ―Declaration Concerning Friendly 
Relations‖] (―States have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force.‖). 
 98. Natalino Ronzitti, The Expanding Law of Self-Defence, 11 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 343, 354 
(2006); see S.C. Res. 188 (XIX), ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/5650 (Apr. 9, 1964). 
 99. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.) (―Nicaragua‖), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 82 
(June 27); see also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion (―Nuclear 
Weapons‖), 1996 I.C.J. 226, 246 (July 8) (―[a]rmed reprisals in time of peace . . . are considered to be 
unlawful‖). 
 100. See Caroline Paradigm, infra note 106. 
 101. See infra note 153. 
 102. GRAY, supra note 44, at 163 (Israel claiming anticipatory self defense when it attacked an 
under-construction Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981). 
 103. See infra note 153. 
 104. See infra note 161; see GRAY, supra note 44, at 161. 
 105. See Eric Schwartz, U.S. Security Strategy: Empowering Kim Jong-Il?, 30 LOY. L.A. INT‘L & 
COMP. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008) (―The Bush administration [U.S.] employed the doctrine of preemptive self-
defense in the war against Iraq without UN approval.‖); GRAY, supra note 44, at 242.  
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between the United States and the United Kingdom.
106
 According to 
Webster, only when the danger posed to a state is ―instant, overwhelming, 
leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation can a state 
respond.‖107 Interestingly, regarding this conflagration, it is pertinent to 
point out that Britain was not acting anticipatorily on U.S. territory against 
the Caroline steamboat as the Caroline had been ―transporting men and 
materials . . . in support of anti British rebellion in Canada.‖108  
The customary international law requirements of immediacy and 
necessity are inextricably linked.
109
 Necessity can only be met when 
alternative peaceful means of resolving the dispute have been exhausted, 
given the time constraints involved.
110
 Proportionality requires the 
response to be proportional in relation to both the wrong suffered and ―the 
nature and the amount of force employed to achieve the objective or 
goal.‖111 Interestingly, as preemptive self defense does away with the 
requirement of immediacy, it is quite tenuous to argue such rights of 
action derive from customary international law. Numerous I.C.J. 
judgments, as in Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. United 
States),
112
 Oil Platforms,
113
 and the advisory opinion on the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
114
 have recognized the requirements of 
necessity and proportionality as limits on the right of self defense.  
Armed attacks can only be committed by a state or its organs and 
agents. This principle was clearly upheld by the I.C.J. in Nicaragua
115
 and 
recently affirmed in the advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of 
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
116
 Non-
state actors cannot undertake an armed attack until state sponsorship is 
present,
117
 and the state from which the non-state actors are operating 
 
 
 106. See Letter from Daniel Webster to Mr. Fox, Apr. 24, 1841, 29 B.S.P 1129 (1843) [hereinafter 
Caroline Paradigm]. 
 107. Id.  
 108. DINSTEIN, supra note 74, at 184–85. 
 109. Shah, supra note 87, at 171. 
 110. Id. at 172. 
 111. RICHARD J. ERICKSON, LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST STATE-SPONSORED 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 146 (1989); see also Naulilaa Case (Port. v. F.R.G.) (1928), 2 R.I.A.A. 
1011, 1026–28 (holding that the destruction of several Portuguese installations in its colony of Angola 
over the course of several weeks in response to a border skirmish in which three German civilians and 
two officers were shot dead was disproportionate). 
 112. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 94, 103. 
 113. Oil Platforms, 42 I.L.M. 1334, 1415. 
 114. Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 245.  
 115. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 103. 
 116. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion (―Wall Construction‖), 43 I.L.M. 1009, 1050 (July 9, 2004).  
 117. See ERICKSON, supra note 111, at 32. 
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cannot be attacked on the basis of self defense, as affirmed in the recent 
Case Concerning Armed Activities (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Uganda).
118
 Furthermore, it was held in Nicaragua that the supply of 
weapons and logistical or other support to non-state actors does not qualify 
as an armed attack.
119
 In Nicaragua, the I.C.J. held that for a state to be 
responsible for the activities of contras, it would ―have to be proved that 
that state had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in 
the course of which the alleged violations were committed.‖120 However, 
in Prosecutor v. Tadić,121 the Court held that to be a de facto organ of the 
state, ―overall control‖ over such outfits would suffice.122 
Nicaragua also held that not all forms of use of force qualify as armed 
attacks justifying self defense,
123
 and that less grave forms of force can 
only warrant legitimate countermeasures.
124
 Such countermeasures likely 
exclude actual uses of force.
125
 This differentiation in attacks has been 
confirmed in Oil Platforms.
126
  
It is therefore clear that non-state terrorist organizations, even while 
residing in one state, cannot undertake armed attacks, for purposes of 
article 51 and the customary international law of self defense, against 
another state without the presence of state sponsorship.
127
 Therefore, 
absent state sponsorship, any resulting use of force on the basis of self 
defense on the territory of another state to neutralize terrorists without the 
consent of the attacked state is a violation of article 2, section 4 of the 
U.N. Charter, and can only be justified if the Charter itself is amended. 
 
 
 118. Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Uganda) (―Congo‖), 2005 I.C.J. 1, 147 (Dec. 19); see also Ronzitti, supra note 98, at 349.  
 119. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 126–27. 
 120. Id. at 65 (emphasis added). See Vincent-Joel Proulx, Babysitting Terrorists: Should States Be 
Strictly Liable for Failing to Prevent Transborder Attacks?, 23 BERKELEY J. INT‘L L. 615, 620 (2005). 
 121. Prosecutor v. Tadić, July 15, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 1518. 
 122. Proulx, supra note 120, at 621; Tadić, 38 I.L.M. at 1545 (stating that no specific instructions 
for directing individual operations or selection of concrete targets are needed to determine overall 
control by the foreign state). 
 123. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 110; DINSTEIN, supra note 74, at 193. 
 124. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 110. 
 125. See DINSTEIN, supra note 74, at 194.  
 126. Oil Platforms, 42 I.L.M. 1334, 1355. 
 127. See id., 42 I.L.M. at 1334. A state acting in self defense has to not only fulfill the high burden 
of proof concerning the commission of an armed attack against it, but it also has to establish that the 
other (belligerent) state had acted with knowledge regarding the nature of its sponsorship. See 
DINSTEIN, supra note 74, at 209 (an attack must be strictly aimed at another country). The Taliban 
lacked such cognition. See DINSTEIN, supra note 74, at 236; Eric Margolis, Bombing Pakistan Back to 
the Stone Age, LewRockwell.com, Oct. 3, 2006, http://www.lewrockwell.com/margolis/margolis52. 
html.  
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Historically, the S.C. has passed numerous resolutions holding terrorist 
acts as threats to international peace and security.
128
 It has condemned acts 
of terrorism and called upon states to refrain from providing support to 
terrorist organizations, prevent and suppress terrorist activities and their 
financing, and actively coordinate with each other to prevent acts of 
terrorism emanating from within their borders.
129
  
However, no S.C. Resolution has affirmed the right to use force against 
another state on the basis of terrorism.
130
 For instance, S.C. Resolution 
1368 was adopted a day after, and in response to, the attacks of September 
11, 2001.
131
 It was not passed under Chapter VII, and it referenced in its 
preamble that both the right of self defense and terrorism were threats to 
international peace and security.
132
 In the non-operative preamble of 
Resolution 1373, adopted on September 28, 2001 and passed under 
Chapter VII,
133
 the S.C. recognized again that both the right of self defense 
and terrorist acts were threats to international peace and security, without 
express reference to Chapter VII.
134
 Neither resolution determined that an 
armed attack transpired that would authorize the use of force.
135
 
Subsequent S.C. resolutions have also focused on tackling international 
terrorism by peaceful means.
136
 This assertion can be substantiated by 
analyzing all recent S.C. resolutions passed in relation to terrorism, 
subsequent to September 11, 2001.
137
 Apart from condemning acts of 
 
 
 128. See GRAY, supra note 44, at 227. 
 129. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 53/1189, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1189 (Aug. 13, 1998); S.C. Res. 54/1269, 
¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1269 (Oct. 19, 1999). 
 130. See GRAY, supra note 44, at 227. 
 131. S.C. Res. 56/1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). 
 132. See id. 
 133. S.C. Res. 56/1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). DINSTEIN, supra note 74, at 285; 
Myjer & White, supra note 42, at 10.  
 134. S.C. Res. 56/1373, supra note 133 (―Reaffirming further that such acts, like any act of 
international terrorism, constitute a threat to international peace and security, Reaffirming the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defence as recognized by the Charter of the United Nations as 
reiterated in resolution 1368 (2001) . . . .‖). 
 135. See DINSTEIN, supra note 74, at 207. 
 136. See GRAY, supra note 44, at 227. 
 137. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 57/1438, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1438 (Oct. 14, 2002) (concerning the Bali 
night club); S.C. Res. 1440, supra note 73 (concerning Moscow hostage taking); S.C. Res. 58/1465, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1465 (Feb. 23, 2003) (concerning Colombia bomb attack); S.C. Res. 58/1516, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1516 (Nov. 20, 2003) (concerning Istanbul bomb attacks); S.C. Res. 57/1450, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1450 (Dec. 13, 2002) (concerning terrorist actions in Kenya); S.C. Res. 58/1456, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1456 (Jan. 20, 2003) (general resolution on tackling terrorism with peaceful means); S.C. Res. 
59/1530, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1530 (Mar. 11, 2004) (concerning Madrid bombings); S.C. Res. 60/1611, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1611 (July 11, 2005) (concerning London terrorist attacks); S.C. Res. 60/1618, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1618 (Aug. 4, 2005) (concerning terrorist attacks in Iraq); S.C. Res. 60/1617, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1617 (July 29, 2005).  
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terrorism and determining them to be threats to international peace and 
security, the resolutions made no reference to the right to use force in self 
defense, even when al-Qaeda had admitted responsibility for the 
commission of the attacks.
138
 
The General Assembly has taken a similarly peaceful approach in 
combating terrorism. It has passed or adopted numerous resolutions,
139
 
declarations,
140
 and conventions
141
 pertaining to terrorism before,
142
 
after,
143
 and in response to the attacks of September 11.
144
 The General 
Assembly has condemned international terrorism strongly and has on 
numerous occasions adopted measures to help eliminate it.
145
 It has called 
for international cooperation between states to prevent, combat, and 
eliminate terrorism through peaceful means.
146
 The General Assembly, 
like the S.C., has not condoned the use of force against other states on the 
basis of terrorism. It has on numerous occasions stated that reprisals are 
unlawful.
147
 Importantly, in its resolutions the General Assembly has 
distinguished between terrorism and the right of people against foreign 
occupation.
148
 
 
 
 138. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1450, supra note 137.  
 139. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 62/71, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/71 (Jan. 8, 2008).  
 140. See Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations, supra note 97, at 121, 123; Declaration on 
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 49/60, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/60 (Dec. 9, 
1994). 
 141. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally 
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; see also 
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997, 2149 U.N.T.S. 
256. 
 142. G.A. Res. 32/147, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/32/147 (Dec. 16, 1977).  
 143. G.A. Res. 60/288, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/288 (Sept. 20, 2006).  
 144. Condemnation of Terrorist Attacks in the United States of America, G.A. Res. 56/1, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/56/1 (July 12, 2001). See GRAY, supra note 44, at 193. 
 145. G.A. Res. 61/40, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/40 (Dec. 6, 2006).  
 146. G.A. Res. 62/172, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/172 (Dec. 18, 2007).  
 147. See Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations, supra note 97, at 122; see generally 
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection 
of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), U.N. Doc. A/6014 (Dec. 21, 1965); 
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, 
G.A. Res. 36/103, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/103 (Dec. 9, 1981). See also Declaration on the Enhancement 
of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Non-use of Force in International Relations, G.A. Res. 42/22, 
U.N. Doc. A/42/766 (Nov. 18, 1987).  
 148. See GRAY, supra note 44, at 235; see also G.A. Res. 46/51, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (Dec. 9, 
1991). 
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Likewise, state practice and opinio juris
149
 do not suggest that a state 
can attack another state on the basis of harboring terrorists,
150
 especially 
when a state acts anticipatorily or preemptively.
151
 Attacks committed in 
response to past actions have overwhelmingly been viewed by the 
community of states as forcible reprisals.
152
 
A few states, like the United States and Israel, on the premise of acting 
in self defense, have utilized force and attacked other states both 
preemptively and for the commission of past attacks, on the basis that the 
states harbor or have harbored alleged terrorists.
153
 As a permanent 
member of the S.C., the United States has been successful in preempting 
the materialization of any S.C. resolution under Chapter VII that might 
condemn such U.S. aggression, through either the exercise or threat of its 
veto.
154
 The community of nations, however, has been quite critical of 
non-permanent member states when they indulge in similar armed 
aggression.
155
 Many states abstain from formally condemning the United 
States in such circumstances because they fear loss of privileges and 
assistance from the United States or economic and non-economic punitive 
retaliatory measures from the sole hegemonic power in the world.
156
 
Therefore, the somewhat muted world response to such military 
adventurism should not be viewed as passive acceptance of the U.S. 
position on the matter.
157
  
 
 
 149. ―[O]pinion that an act is necessary by rule of law . . . . The principle that for conduct or a 
practice to become a rule of customary international law, it must be shown that nations believe that 
international law (rather than moral obligation) mandates the conduct or practice.‖ BLACK‘S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1125 (8th ed. 2005). 
 150. See GRAY, supra note 44, at 195–96. 
 151. See, e.g., the international condemnation of Israel‘s attack on Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq 
in 1981, S.C. Res. 36/487, U.N. Doc. S/RES/487 (June 19, 1981). 
 152. GRAY, supra note 44, at 197–98. 
 153. Some examples: Israeli raid of Beirut Airport in 1968; Israeli preemptive strikes on 
Palestinian camps in Lebanon in 1975; Israeli attacks on PLO headquarters in Tunis in 1985; U.S. 
attacks for past attacks and to deter future attacks on Tripoli in 1986; U.S. attacks on Afghanistan and 
Sudan in response to the attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Ethiopia in 1999. CASSESE, supra 
note 74, at 472–73. 
 154. See, e.g., the vetoes by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France of a draft 
resolution condemning U.S. attacks on Tripoli in 1986, CASSESE, supra note 74, at 473. See also U.N. 
Charter art. 27, para. 3 (allowing permanent Security Council members to veto any decisions under 
Chapter VII even if it is a party to the dispute).  
 155. S.C. Res. 262 (XXIII), U.N. Doc. S/RES/262 (Dec. 31, 1968) (condemnation of Israel over 
Beirut airport attack in 1968); see CASSESE, supra note 74, at 473 (unanimous condemnation of Israel 
over 1975 attacks on Palestinian camps in Lebanon); S.C. Res. 40/573, U.N. Doc. S/RES/0573 (Oct. 4, 
1985) (condemnation of Israeli attacks on PLO headquarters in Tunis).  
 156. Shah, supra note 87, at 169–70. 
 157. However, even then there has been moderate condemnation of the United States‘ expansive 
use of force on the basis of self defense, and those states that have refrained from such condemnation 
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It is in light of this phenomenon that one must critique the level of 
international recognition of U.S. attacks on Afghanistan in response to the 
attacks of September 11. The grave nature of the September 11 attacks and 
the level of devastation caused to the only hegemon in the global 
community of states rendered it practically impossible for nearly all world 
nations to openly criticize and question the legality of U.S. actions in 
Afghanistan, unless the concerned state already had an extremely hostile 
relationship with the United States.
158
 There was immense pressure on the 
U.S. government by the American populace to stigmatize the perpetrators 
and substantiate government authority.
159
 Most of the world community 
was willing to accept this outcome as a consequence of geo-political 
realities; this acceptance, however, is not synonymous with the assertion 
that the world community recognized the legality of U.S. actions or the 
principles on which they were based.
160
 This was an isolated case of non-
legal acquiescence at best by the world order, which is verified by the fact 
that subsequent to September 11, 2001, an overwhelming majority of 
states condemned states, including the United States, when force was used 
in response to past actions or preemptively against nations alleged to have 
harbored or have had links to alleged terrorists.
161
 
It was not surprising that the United Kingdom and France, traditional 
U.S. Western allies and concurrent members of NATO, aligned with the 
United States and actively supported its mode of operation in 
Afghanistan.
162
 What was groundbreaking, however, was the fact that the 
 
 
have been careful not to adopt the U.S. understanding of self defense. See GRAY, supra note 44, at 
198. 
 158. See GRAY, supra note 44, at 193 (―Only Iraq directly challenged the legality of the military 
action [in Afghanistan].‖).  
 159. See DANIEL MOECKLI, HUMAN RIGHTS AND NON-DISCRIMINATION IN THE ‗WAR ON 
TERROR‘ 25 (Oxford 2008). 
 160. See Shah, supra note 87, at 169; see also GRAY, supra note 44, at 208–09. 
 161. See GRAY, supra note 44, at 212 (highlighting opposition of states towards the legality of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom on the basis of preemptive self defense relative to terrorism); id. at 236 
(international rejection of the legitimacy of the use of force by Israel when it attacked Syrian positions 
in Lebanon in 2001 and inside Syria in 2003 on the basis of harboring terrorists); see also S.C. Res. 
64/1860, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1860 (Jan. 8, 2009); GRAY, supra note 44, at 241 (outlining that most 
states condemned Israeli use of force in Lebanon on the basis of exercising the right of self defense 
against Hezbollah in 2006 as disproportionate). See Press Release, General Assembly, General 
Assembly Demands Full Respect For Security Council Resolution 1860, U.N. Doc. GA/10809/Rev. 1 
(Jan. 16, 2009) (statement of Maria Rubiales De Chamorro, Nicaragua) (General Assembly demanding 
the ―full withdrawal of Israeli forces [from the Gaza strip] and unimpeded provision of humanitarian 
assistance‖ to its inhabitants). 
 162. There are serious conflicts of interest and impartiality concerns when permanent S.C. 
members make determinations concerning acts of aggression and breach of peace when they are also 
members of collective security arrangements, such as NATO, which have also been invoked. See 
North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243. In principle, however, the 
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other two remaining permanent members of the S.C., Russia and China, 
were uncharacteristically supportive of the initiation of the U.S. armed 
campaign in Afghanistan.
163
 Historically these two nations have taken a 
contrary position to the United States in matters pertaining to foreign 
policy and international relations and therefore provided the requisite 
balance of power within the S.C.
164
 However, both states were highly 
supportive of U.S. actions in Afghanistan because of an extraordinary 
alignment of strategic interests since both Russia and China continue to 
grapple with secessionist movements from within their own territories in 
the proximity of Afghanistan.
165
 The insurgents belong to ethnically 
distinct groups that subscribe to the Muslim faith and have been fighting 
or demanding their inherent right to self-determination for a long period of 
time.
166
 Both Russia and China classify these secessionist movements as 
embedded with terrorism that enjoy the support of the Taliban and al-
Qaeda,
167
 and which pose a threat to their territorial integrity.
168
  
Finally, the S.C.‘s acquiescence in the attacks on Afghanistan can also 
perhaps be attributed to the fact that none of its permanent members 
officially recognized the Taliban regime, nor were any of them financially 
or politically invested in Afghanistan sufficiently.
169
 Unlike other states in 
the region, Afghanistan‘s natural resources, such as oil and gas, cannot be 
easily exploited due to ―civil war and poor pipeline infrastructure.‖170 Had 
it been otherwise, the Taliban would have had considerable leverage in 
dealing with powerful states of the S.C.  
 
 
NATO Charter explicitly subordinates itself to the U.N. Charter on such matters. See Bruno Simma, 
NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 1, 3, 5 (1999).  
 163. Paul Dibb, The Future of International Coalitions: How Useful? How Manageable?, WASH. 
Q., Spring 2002, at 131, 139 (2002).  
 164. See GRAY, supra note 44, at 363–64. 
 165. Thomas D. Grant, Current Development: Afghanistan Recognizes Chechnya, 15 AM. U. 
INT‘L L. REV. 869, 871 (2000); Sean Yom, Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang, FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS, 
Dec. 31, 2001, http://selfdetermine.irc-online.org/listserv/011213.html. 
 166. Yom, supra note 165; Johanna Nichols, Who Are the Chechen? (1995), http://iseees.berkeley. 
edu/sites/default/files/u4/bps_/caucasus_/articles_/nichols_1995-chechen.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 
2009). 
 167. Grant, supra note 165. 
 168. Id. (Chechnya for Russia); Xing Guangcheng, China’s Foreign Policy Towards Kazakhstan, 
in THINKING STRATEGICALLY: THE MAJOR POWERS, KAZAKHSTAN, AND THE CENTRAL ASIAN NEXUS 
107, 111 (Robert Legvold ed., 2003); Seva Gunitskiy, In the Spotlight: East Turkestan Islamic 
Movement, Ctr. for Def. Info., Dec. 9, 2002, http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/etim.cfm (Xingiang 
Province for China). 
 169. But see generally Andy Rowell, Route to Riches, GUARDIAN, Oct. 24, 2001, http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/society/2001/oct/24/warinafghanistan2001.afghanistan. 
 170. Id. 
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Predictably, however, muted international criticism of the U.S. attacks 
on Afghanistan, which were carried out on the basis of self defense in 
response to terrorism, has had tremendous negative ramifications for both 
respect for international law and global peace and stability. For instance, it 
has provided an impetus to many states to freely and disproportionately 
attack other states on the basis of terrorism either on whim or pretext,
171
 
and it has perpetuated the development of unacceptable attitudes such as 
the Bush Doctrine, which also allows for use of force against non-
imminent threats.
172
 For example, the United States justified the long 
drawn ―Operation Iraqi Freedom‖ on the basis of terrorism.173 
Disproportionate Israeli armed attacks and incursions in Lebanon
174
 and 
Gaza,
175
 which caused immense civilian casualties and suffering, were also 
based on the same self defense and terrorism connections.
176
 These 
developments greatly endangered international peace and security. What is 
more disturbing is that this espoused framework of preemptive and 
retaliatory acts, when justified on the basis of a terrorist connection, 
however tenuous the connection might be, has serious potential to ignite a 
much more dangerous armed conflict involving the use of nuclear 
weapons, for instance between Pakistan and India.
177
 
 
 
 171. See GRAY, supra note 44, at 212. See also Ban ‘Appalled’ by Gaza’s Damage, BBC NEWS, 
Jan. 20, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7839863.stm (Secretary General of U.N., Ban Ki 
Moon, critical of Israel for disproportionate use of force); see also Stephanie Nebehay, U.N. Rights 
Chief Calls for Gaza War Crimes Probe, REUTERS U.K., Jan. 9, 2009, http://uk.reuters.com/article/ 
UKNews1/idUKTRE50851M20090109; see also Mystery Over Sudan ‘Air Strike’, BBC NEWS, Mar. 
26, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7966627.stm (―Israel‘s Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, did 
not confirm any raid but said Israel hit everywhere to stop terror. ‗That was true in the north,‘ said Mr. 
Olmert, ‗and it was true in the south . . . Those who need to know, know there is no place where Israel 
cannot operate.‘‖). See also GRAY, supra note 44, at 237–44 (outlining that Israeli use of force in 
Lebanon in 2006 on the basis of self defense against Hezbollah was excessive, disproportionate, and 
beyond legality.).  
 172. GRAY, supra note 44, at 212. 
 173. See GRAY, supra note 44, at 217–18, 345 (quoting President Bush in 2003 stating that Iraq 
was now the ―central front on the war against terrorism‖); see RASHID, supra note 54, at XLIX (―You 
can‘t distinguish between al Qaeda and Saddam when you talk about the war on terror.‖ (quoting 
President Bush in 2002 before the Iraqi invasion.)). 
 174. See GRAY, supra note 44, at 241. 
 175. Richard Falk, Israel’s War Crimes, TRANSNAT‘L INST., Mar. 1, 2009, http://www.tni.org 
(under the ―People‖ tab, follow ―Contributors‖ hyperlink, then follow ―Richard Falk‖ hyperlink, then 
follow ―Israel‘s War Crimes‖ hyperlink); Security Council Calls on Israel, Palestinians to End 
Violence Immediately, UN NEWS CENTRE, Dec. 28, 2008, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp? 
NewsID=29427&Cr=Palestin&Cr1; World Leaders React to Israel‘s Operation in Gaza, ANTI-
DEFAMATION LEAGUE, Dec. 31, 2008, http://www.adl.org/main_International_Affairs/World_ 
Reactions_Israel_Gaza.htm?Multi_page_sections=sHeading_4. 
 176. GRAY, supra note 44, at 237–38. 
 177. See JACKSON NYAMUYA MAOGOTO, BATTLING TERRORISM: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
USE OF FORCE AND THE WAR ON TERROR 137 (2005). 
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Though some international law scholars would differ,
178
 the concept of 
terrorism remains elusive in international law
179
 and continues to be 
defined in normative ways.
180
 This is an extremely important observation 
as article 51 of the U.N. Charter recognizes a state‘s inherent right to use 
force in self defense when an armed attack occurs.
181
 Therefore, without a 
definition of terrorism, the determination of whether and which acts of 
terrorism qualify as armed attacks for purposes of article 51 becomes 
meaningless.  
B. The Legality of U.S. Attacks on Afghanistan  
U.S. and British forces commenced their aerial campaign on 
Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, with the United States proclaiming that it 
was exercising its inherent right of self defense.
182
 What followed was a 
disproportionate use of force employed by the United States that cannot 
find a basis in either the U.N. Charter or norms of customary international 
law. By attacking Afghanistan, the U.S. violated article 2, section 4 of the 
U.N. Charter. 
It is pertinent to note that the S.C. resolutions adopted in the backdrop 
of September 11
183
 neither mention Afghanistan nor, under Chapter VII of 
the U.N. Charter, sanction any use of force against any state involved in 
acts of terrorism.
184
 Moreover, although the General Assembly resolution 
adopted in response to the attacks of September 11 condemned these 
attacks in the strongest of words, it did not acknowledge any right to use 
force in response.
185
  
 
 
 178. CASSESE, supra note 74, at 449. 
 179. See MOECKLI, supra note 159, at 24, 44–48. The Draft Comprehensive Convention on 
International Terrorism has not progressed due to disagreement between states over the definition of 
terrorism. Id. at 47.  
 180. Id.  
 181. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 182. See Letter Dated 7 October 2001 from [John D. Negroponte] the Permanent Representative 
of the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/946 (Oct. 7, 2001); S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 134 (the United States 
reporting its exercise of self defense to the S.C. as required under article 51); Christopher B. Hynes et 
al., National Security, 41 INT‘L LAW 683, 685 (2007). 
 183. S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 131; S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 134. 
 184. In contrast, under S.C. Res. 45/678, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990), the S.C., 
acting under Chapter VII, authorized ―Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait . . . 
to use all necessary means . . . to restore international peace and security in the area‖ and achieve 
Iraq‘s withdrawal from Kuwait. This mandate has been understood to clearly authorize the use of force 
against Iraq in case of its non-compliance.  
 185. G.A. Res. 1, supra note 144. 
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The attacks of September 11 ended that day, but the U.S. reactionary 
assault on Afghanistan endured for four weeks in the nature of an unlawful 
reprisal.
186
 There was no state sponsorship by the Taliban, the de facto 
government of Afghanistan, of al-Qaeda and its operations when al-Qaeda 
was wholly responsible for carrying out the September 11 attacks on U.S. 
soil.
187
 One cannot therefore classify the attacks on the United States as an 
armed attack carried out by the Taliban regime for purposes of article 51 
of the U.N. Charter.
188
 The Taliban administration was perhaps guilty of 
―state toleration‖ or ―state support‖189 of al-Qaeda and its activities,190 but 
it neither exercised ―effective control,‖191 as outlined in Nicaragua, nor 
―overall control,‖192 as presented in the Tadić judgment.  
Many eminent Western scholars of international law somewhat 
impetuously determined the Taliban‘s responsibility for the events of 
September 11, either on the basis of dubious facts or unsound reasoning 
that, generally speaking, ran the risk of fomenting armed aggression 
globally.
193
 For instance, one prominent international law scholar, though 
acknowledging the non-involvement of the Taliban regime in any manner 
in the planning or commission of the attacks of September 11,
194
 still 
determined that the Taliban became accomplices to the attacks because by 
―refusing to take any measures against al-Qaeda and bin Laden—and 
continuing to offer them shelter within its territory—Afghanistan endorsed 
 
 
 186. See Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 246.  
 187. John Mueller, How Dangerous Are the Taliban?, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Apr. 15, 2009, http:// 
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64932/john-mueller/how-dangerous-are-the-taliban?page=show. 
 188. See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 18, 103–04; see Wall Construction, 43 I.L.M. 1009, 1049–50; 
Ronzitti, supra note 98, at 348 (―It is interesting to note that the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories stated that an armed attack should be 
attributable to a State to fall under the law of self-defence.‖). 
 189. Shah, supra note 21, at 158. 
 190. See generally Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9) (holding that 
there is international responsibility towards another state if a state allowed one‘s own territory to be 
knowingly used against the other). 
 191. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 64–65. 
 192. Tadić, 38 I.L.M. 1518. 
 193. GRAY, supra note 44, at 194; Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States 
Relating to International Law, 96 AM. J. INT‘L L. 237, 243–44 (2002); Michael N. Schmitt, 
Preemptive Strategies in International Law, 24 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 513, 541 (2003) (―[T]here was 
virtually no criticism of the 2001 incursions [by the U.S.] into Afghanistan to strike at al-Qa‘ida after 
the Taliban failed to comply with U.N. and U.S. demands to surrender Osama bin Laden and his 
lieutenants.‖); Byers, supra note 78, at 408 (stating unequivocally that the Taliban refused to hand 
over Bin Laden when this was a contestable determination). For an alternative view, see The Military 
Campaign, BBC NEWS, Oct. 23, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1597509.stm (―The United States 
rejects a Taleban offer of talks on handing Osama Bin Laden over to a third country if the bombing 
stops.‖). 
 194. DINSTEIN, supra note 74, at 236. 
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the armed attacks against the U.S. [and the] . . . Taliban led government 
assumed responsibility of the terrorist acts,‖195 which was sufficient reason 
for the United States to invoke the right of self defense against 
Afghanistan.  
According to the author, however, it is contestable that the Taliban 
regime was completely unwilling to negotiate with the United States either 
directly or indirectly, such as through a third country like Pakistan, or was 
also blatantly refusing to take any measure against al-Qaeda or its 
leadership.
196
 It is plausible that the United States had, subsequent or even 
antecedent
197
 to the events of September 11, decided to take armed action 
against Taliban-Afghanistan, and had no desire to negotiate with the 
Taliban whatsoever after it was attacked on September 11.
198
 Yet, even if 
the Taliban regime continued to offer a safe haven to al-Qaeda members 
after September 11, and moreover, had endorsed the terrorist attacks on 
U.S. soil, these actions for purposes of article 51 of the U.N. Charter do 
not amount to committing the September 11 attacks themselves. In other 
words, a state cannot be responsible, post facto and via imputation, for 
armed attacks against another state that have already occurred without 
having any material involvement during their commission, when by 
definition such a priori state involvement is a requirement not only for 
according blame to a state, but also for the advent of an armed attack 
under international law.  
An interesting question arises at this juncture: did the Taliban regime 
qualify as a government capable of sponsoring al-Qaeda and its terrorist 
activities for the purpose of committing an armed attack under 
international law? Under international law, the existence of a state is 
determined under two competing theories respectively known as the 
Constitutive and Declarative Theories of Statehood.
199
 The Declarative 
Theory of Statehood was codified under the Montevideo Convention of 
 
 
 195. Id. 
 196. See, e.g., Shah, supra note 21, at 172–74 (The Taliban had requested from the United States 
credible evidence concerning al-Qaeda‘s and Osama bin Laden‘s involvement in the attacks of 
September 11 and were open to discussing handing over Osama bin Laden to a neutral Muslim country 
such as Jordan, right after the commencement of U.S. strikes.). 
 197. George Arney, U.S. ‘Planned Attack on Taleban’, BBC NEWS, Sept. 18, 2001, http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1550366.stm; David Leigh, Attack and Counter-Attack, GUARDIAN, Sept. 
26, 2001, http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4264545,00.html. 
 198. Daniel Lak, Analysis: Decoding Taleban’s Message, BBC NEWS, Sept. 30, 2001, http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1571891.stm. 
 199. CASSESE, supra note 74, at 73–74; see IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 86–88 (2008).  
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1933,
200
 which was ratified by the United States. Furthermore, as opposed 
to the Constitutive Theory, the Declarative Theory is widely recognized in 
international law.
201
 State recognition by other states, under the 
Declarative Theory in contrast to under the Constitutive theory, is not a 
necessary element in determining the existence of statehood.
202
  
The question presented, however, is not whether Afghanistan fulfills 
the requirement of a state, because apart from being a recognized state in 
the international community of nations, Afghanistan has always been an 
established member of the U.N. The question presented here is whether 
the Taliban authorities qualified, or were thus capable of being classified, 
as the Afghani government when their authority was officially recognized 
by only three states,
203
 albeit regionally important, prior to the attacks of 
September 11. The response to this query would be in the affirmative, 
especially when determined under the widely recognized Declarative 
Theory of Statehood, because the Taliban regime exercised effective 
control and sovereignty over ninety percent of Afghani territory and 
population.
204
 However primordial, the Taliban had in place the only 
functional system of government in Afghanistan.
205
 In effect, the Taliban 
possessed ―a central structure capable of exercising effective control over 
a human community living in a given territory,‖206 and indeed enjoyed 
―effective possession of, and control over, a territory.‖207 Therefore, the 
Taliban as an entity was legally capable of committing armed attacks 
against other nations.
208
  
 
 
 200. BROWNLIE, supra note 199, at 87 n.10. Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, 
Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 3100, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, 25 (―The state as a person of international law 
should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) 
government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.‖). 
 201. BROWNLIE, supra note 199, at 88. 
 202. Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 3, 49 Stat. 3097, 3100, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, 25 
(―The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states.‖); see also 
Matthew N. Bathon, Note, The Atypical International Status of the Holy See, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT‘L 
L. 597 (2001). 
 203. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. JAMES J. F. FOREST, COUNTERING 
TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: LESSONS FROM THE FIGHT AGAINST 
TERRORISM 117 (2007); JOHN L. ESPOSITO, UNHOLY WAR: TERROR IN THE NAME OF ISLAM 17 (2002). 
 204. KAMAL MATINUDDIN, THE TALIBAN PHENOMENON: 1994–1997, at 140 (1999). 
 205. Id. at 140, 144. 
 206. See CASSESSE, supra note 74, at 73. 
 207. Id.  
 208. In fact, absent the commission of an armed attack by the Taliban regime against the United 
States, the United States‘ arming and support of the Northern Alliance rebels and contras would be 
illegal, as determined by Nicaragua. Myjer & White, supra note 42, at 7–8.  
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Additionally, under the Draft Articles on State Responsibility
209
 
adopted by the International Law Commission (―I.L.C.‖) and supported by 
a General Assembly resolution,
210
 the Taliban government would be liable 
for international wrongful acts perpetrated by it even if its authority was 
not internationally recognized.
211
 The Draft Articles, however, ―excludes 
forcible measures from the ambit of permissible countermeasures . . . .‖212  
Likewise, both the initiation of the U.S. armed campaign in 
Afghanistan and its continuance were unlawful acts of self defense under 
customary international law. The U.S. assault on Afghanistan came four 
weeks after the attacks of September 11. It is hard to fathom how Daniel 
Webster‘s formulation relating to the immediacy and necessity 
requirements of self-defense, under which a state is allowed to respond in 
legitimate self-defense
213
 only when the danger posed to it is ―instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moments for 
deliberation,‖214 was met. 
Additionally, an aerial bombardment campaign throughout Afghanistan 
employing heavy-handed weaponry causing thousands of civilian 
 
 
 209. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. GAOR 
Int‘l L. Comm‘n, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1 (July 26, 2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles 
on State Responsibility]. 
 210. G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex, Agenda Item 162, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002) (the General Assembly resolution commended the articles ―to the 
attention of Governments without prejudice to the question of their future adoption or other 
appropriate action.‖).  
 211. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 209, art. 8; moreover, under Corfu Channel 
as determined by the I.C.J., the Taliban regime would be in breach of its obligation ―not to allow 
knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States,‖ Corfu Channel, 1949 
I.C.J. 4, 22. Such a breach, however, does not translate into an armed attack for purposes of article 51. 
See also Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 
I.C.J. 3, 29–30, 33–36 (May 24) (upholding Draft Articles on State Responsibility for adopting or 
approving actions of private persons or entities). 
 212. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
commentaries, art. 50, ¶ 4, in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-
third Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Draft 
Articles], available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf. 
Actions undertaken by states on the basis of a valid exercise of self defense or necessity preclude 
wrongfulness under the Draft Articles. States, however, cannot utilize armed reprisal as 
countermeasures for punishing wrongfulness. See DINSTEIN, supra note 74, at 226; see also Draft 
Articles, art. 25, ¶ 21 (―[A]s embodied in article 25, the plea of necessity is not intended to cover 
conduct which is in principle regulated by the primary obligations. This has a particular importance in 
relation to the rules relating to the use of force in international relations and to the question of ‗military 
necessity.‘‖). 
 213. See Myjer & White, supra note 42, at 8 (―[I]mmediacy appears to have been lost . . . [in] the 
current crisis the attack was over and the response appeared more in the shape of punitive reprisals, 
actions that are generally viewed as illegal in international law.‖). 
 214. Caroline Paradigm, supra note 106. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
106 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 9:77 
 
 
 
 
casualties,
215
 millions of refugees, large-scale destruction of the already 
decrepit public infrastructure, and tremendous suffering was hardly 
―necessary.‖216 A well-planned, targeted ground offensive with commando 
units would have been more effective in battling al-Qaeda and sympathetic 
armed militias, and would have kept collateral damage, including civilian 
causalities, to a minimum.
217
 Moreover, the non-deployment of U.S. 
ground forces in Afghanistan in order to both minimize troop casualties 
and cost resulted in the escape of top al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders and the 
preventable massacre of thousands of Taliban prisoners at the hands of the 
Northern Alliance forces.
218
 This hardly affected the primary purpose of 
the United States in attacking Afghanistan—neutralizing the al-Qaeda 
leadership.  
A full-fledged war was also unnecessary because the United States did 
not earnestly pursue and exhaust all peaceful means of resolution.
219
 Even 
a staunch consequentialist would find this war unnecessary and 
counterproductive as both the military campaign and its mode of operation 
fueled and strengthened the cancer of global terrorism rather than 
neutralizing it or al-Qaeda. Today, terrorism poses a much more serious 
threat to all nations, both in the proximity of Afghanistan and elsewhere, 
and to international peace and security.  
 
 
 215. See RASHID, supra note 54, at 97–98. 
 216. Shah, supra note 87, at 176–77.  
 217. Id. at 177. 
 218. RASHID, supra note 54, at 91, 95 (The systematic commission of atrocities by Northern 
Alliance forces after winning the war in Afghanistan on the Pashtun community in the presence of 
U.S. silence fueled the re-insurgence of the Taliban.). 
 219. Although correct initiatives were undertaken in trying to resolve the dispute amicably, S.C. 
Res. 54/1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999) (demanding the handover of Osama bin Laden 
and halting the provision of sanctuary to terrorists) as well as through S.C. Res. 55/1333, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000) (mandating the closure of terrorists camps, seizure of Taliban assets 
abroad and an arms ban) and S.C. Res. 56/1363, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1363 (July 30, 2001) (authorizing 
monitors for enforcing the arms embargo), more effective measures that might have produced real 
results were ignored. For instance, Pakistan, which wielded a lot of influence and control over the 
Taliban, was not adequately pressured to reign in on the Taliban by the United States or the Security 
Council before the events of September 11. RASHID, supra note 54, at 16. Moreover, cultural 
sensitivities were ignored and tribal custom and the Pashtunwali code of behavior were ridiculed rather 
than effectively utilized by the United States. President Bush‘s message to the Taliban that he would 
―smoke [the Taliban] out of their holes‖ if they did not unilaterally meet his demands blatantly 
challenged Nang (honor) and Ghairat (pride) of the Pashtunwali code of behavior. Naomi Wax, Ideas 
& Trends: Notes from Underground, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2001, § 4 (Week in Review)), at 6; Nic 
Robertson, Afghan Taliban Spokesman: We Will Win the War, CNN NEWS, May 5, 2009, 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/05/04/robertson.interview.zabiullah.mujahid/index.html?ir
ef=mpstoryviewv (―Not long after 9/11, one senior Taliban official told me Osama bin Laden was a 
pain in the backside. Hard to control, intent on doing his own thing. The only reason they didn‘t turn 
him over was out of fearsome ethnic tribal loyalty known as Pashtunwali.‖). 
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To anyone familiar with the Afghan region and its complexities, the 
adverse ramifications of Operation Enduring Freedom were expected, 
given the manner in which it was implemented. To root out terrorism 
emanating from Afghanistan, vital state and nation-building initiatives 
were required; a full-scale war was counterproductive and unnecessary. 
Exacerbating the situation is the U.S. administration‘s continued 
avoidance, while occupying Afghanistan, of its obligation to adequately 
promote effective state- and nation-building.
220
 In fact, in order to sustain a 
cheap war in Afghanistan by deploying insufficient U.S. ground troops, 
the U.S. administration has funded, promoted, and relied upon ruthless and 
corrupt local warlords, whose oppressive rule had prompted the original 
inception of the Taliban from within the lower classes, to defeat al-Qaeda 
and the Taliban.
221
 As a result, the Afghan federal government is bankrupt, 
and its authority virtually non-existent, at the expense of filling up the 
coffers of these criminal warlords with reconstruction funding.
222
 The 
return of the warlords and their abhorrent rule with U.S. support, coupled 
with the lack of promised development, has once more left the hapless 
population of Afghanistan dejected, and has yet again ignited the 
resurgence of the Taliban movement.
223
  
In addition, U.S. operations in Afghanistan were neither proportional in 
relation to the wrong it suffered, or the nature and intensity of the force it 
employed to achieve its objectives.
224
 First, to retaliate against the events 
of September 11, the United States launched an all-out war against 
arguably the least developed nation in the world, and continues to occupy 
Afghanistan indefinitely under Operation Enduring Freedom, primarily on 
the same basis of self defense for what transpired on a single day nearly a 
decade ago. U.S. aerial bombing might have been effective in minimizing 
military casualties, but came at the cost of massive loss of civilian life and 
related suffering. Hospitals, mosques, old homes, and even buildings 
belonging to international aid agencies were bombed, creating millions of 
Afghan refugees.
225
 The weaponry utilized was also controversial; carpet 
and cluster bombs
226
 used were not precision-guided, and daisy cutters, 
weighing around fifteen thousand pounds each, destroyed everything in a 
 
 
 220. RASHID, supra note 54, at 133–34. 
 221. Id. at 129. 
 222. Id. at 136. 
 223. Id. at 135, 137. 
 224. See ERICKSON, supra note 99, at 145.  
 225. Shah, supra note 21, at 176–77. 
 226. RASHID, supra note 54, at 98 (―The United States dropped 1,228 cluster bombs, which 
released a quarter of a million bomblets that continued to kill or maim civilians years later.‖). 
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six hundred-yard radius.
227
 This was hardly a proportional use of 
weaponry to the Taliban‘s use of small arms and launch of small-group 
guerilla tactics.
228
  
Some see the U.S. war in Afghanistan justifiable on the basis of either 
humanitarian or democratic intervention, or on the basis of regime 
change.
229
 However, use of force on such grounds is not firmly recognized 
under international law.
230
 Recognition is even more doubtful when states 
act either unilaterally or with the support of only their allies because of the 
potential for abuse, rather than according to a multilateral initiative that is 
undertaken with international consensus.
231
 
II. OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN: ISAF AND OPERATION ENDURING 
FREEDOM  
It is true that the S.C. welcomed regime change in Afghanistan, as 
evinced from the adoption of S.C. Resolution 1386 on December 20, 
2001.
232
 Earlier, S.C. Resolution 1378, adopted while the demise of the 
Taliban was not yet complete, condemned the Taliban for their 
involvement in terrorism and was supportive of ―the efforts of the Afghan 
People to replace the Taliban regime.‖233 These occurrences, however, are 
not synonymous with either the view that the basis on which the U.S. used 
force against Afghanistan was legal per se, or the belief that there was 
international recognition that U.S. action in Afghanistan was a legitimate 
exercise of self defense.  
 
 
 227. Associated Press, U.S. Dropping Huge Bomb on Taliban, Nov. 6, 2001, available at http:// 
www.commondreams.org/headlines01/1106-02.htm. 
 228. Shah, supra note 21, at 176–77. See also MICHAEL VINAY BHATIA & MARK SEDRA, 
AFGHANISTAN, ARMS AND CONFLICT: ARMED GROUPS, DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY IN A POST-
WAR SOCIETY 38, 56 (2008); see generally Two Canadians Die in Afghan Clash, CNN NEWS, Oct. 15, 
2006, http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/10/14/afghan.kidnap.nato/index.html. 
 229. Similarly, Belgium argued for humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. Christine Gray, From 
Unity to Polarization: International Law and the Use of Force Against Iraq, 13 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 10, 15 
(2002). The United Kingdom based its enforcement of the no-fly zones in Iraq for protecting the Kurds 
in the North and the Shia‘s in the south of the country on humanitarian intervention. Id. at 9–10. 
 230. See Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations, supra note 97 (excludes the right of 
intervention); see Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 5, ¶ 1, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 
Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974) (outlining invalid justifications for committing 
aggression); see U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7 (prohibiting U.N. intervention relative to matters 
essentially within domestic jurisdiction); see Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 100. But see GRAY, supra 
note 44, at 58–59 (Pro-democratic intervention was explicitly authorized by the Security Council in 
Haiti, and humanitarian and pro-democratic intervention was condoned by the Security Council in 
Sierra Leone.). 
 231. See GRAY, supra note 44, at 58–59. 
 232. S.C. Res. 56/1386, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1386 (Dec. 20, 2001). 
 233. S.C. Res. 56/1378, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1378 (Nov. 14, 2001). 
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Deciding whether a lawful exercise of self defense has been employed 
is a legal and objective determination made in light of the surroundings 
facts. In making this determination, international state recognition of the 
resulting state of affairs from the exercise of such use of force is of 
ancillary, at best, evidentiary value. Furthermore, the belief that there was 
international state recognition of U.S. action as a valid exercise of self 
defense is questionable given that most states accepted regime change in 
Afghanistan on other bases, such as any combination of political, strategic, 
or human rights considerations.
234
 At best, the acceptance of the global 
community of the resulting state of affairs in Afghanistan was based on 
non-legal justifications.
235
 This acceptance was not of the method that 
brought about the regime change in Afghanistan—the U.S. military‘s use 
of force in Afghanistan as self defense. Likewise, when the United States 
and United Kingdom invaded Iraq under Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 
and toppled the government of Saddam Hussein, the S.C. and other 
nations accepted the status quo even when this time, all other permanent 
S.C. members (France, China and Russia) and the overwhelming majority 
of states had clearly found the war in Iraq to be illegal under international 
law.
236
  
While the Taliban regime was collapsing, the S.C. accepted the change 
of circumstances in Afghanistan and subsequently acted by recognizing 
and welcoming the U.N.-brokered Bonn Agreement,
237
 under which an 
interim governmental authority in Afghanistan was instituted.
238
 On 
December 20, 2001, under S.C. Resolution 1386, the S.C., acting under 
Chapter VII, authorized ―the establishment for 6 months of an 
International Security Assistance Force [(―ISAF‖)] to assist the Afghan 
Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its 
surrounding areas.‖239 The ISAF mandate was subsequently extended for 
an additional six months,
240
 but its jurisdiction was not expanded to other 
areas of Afghanistan because of U.S. opposition.
241
 This was possibly 
 
 
 234. GRAY, supra note 44, at 231–32; Rachel Reid, For Afghan Women, Rights Again at Risk, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Aug. 18, 2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/08/18/afghan-women-
rights-again-risk; see, e.g., RASHID, supra note 54, at 31–32 (discussing Pakistan‘s decision to side 
with the United States for strategic reasons).  
 235. Shah, supra note 87, at 169–70. 
 236. GRAY, supra note 44, at 364. 
 237. See Grant T. Harris, The Era of Multilateral Occupation, 24 BERKELEY J. INT‘L L. 1, 49–51 
(2006); S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 134. 
 238. See S.C. Res. 56/1383, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1383 (Dec. 6, 2001). 
 239. S.C. Res. 1386, supra note 232, ¶ 1. 
 240. S.C. Res. 57/1413, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1413 (May 23, 2002). 
 241. Ahmed Rashid, U.S. Placing Greater Emphasis on Economic Stabilization in Afghanistan, 
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because the United States felt that such expansion of ISAF jurisdiction 
would cause interference to Operation Enduring Freedom and the capture 
of al-Qaeda members.
242
 In August 2003, NATO took command of 
ISAF.
243
 Eventually, however, in October 2003 under S.C. Resolution 
1510,
244
 ISAF jurisdiction was extended beyond Kabul
245
 and then 
extended to the whole of Afghanistan by October 2006.
246
 Periodically, 
numerous S.C. resolutions have extended the ISAF mandate for additional 
periods of time.
247
 
ISAF is a U.N.-mandated peacekeeping force charged with providing 
security and assistance in state- and nation-building by facilitating the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan.
248
 ISAF has, however, been extensively 
involved in aggressive and proactive combat operations against Taliban 
insurgents. Numerous questions arise regarding the creation of ISAF and 
its course of conduct. Is ISAF, by involving itself in full-scale combat 
operations, overreaching the confines of its mandate?
249
 If ISAF‘s mandate 
allows for aggressive use of force beyond self defense under Chapter VII, 
then is such afforded authority legal under the U.N. Charter? In other 
words, can peacekeeping or peacemaking forces be given Chapter VII 
enforcement functions? If so, then is such a course of action advisable, 
keeping in mind the negative experiences and serious problems faced in 
Yugoslavia and Somalia where similar peacekeeping and enforcement 
operations were underway contemporaneously?
250
 Though such queries 
 
 
EURASIANET, Sept. 6, 2002, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav060902. 
shtml. 
 242. Rashid, supra note 241. 
 243. Harris, supra note 237, at 52.  
 244. S.C. Res. 58/1510, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1510 (Oct. 13, 2003). 
 245. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Seeks Expansion of Role of International 
Effort in Afghanistan, To Extend Beyond Kabul, U.N. Doc. SC/7894 (Oct. 13, 2003). 
 246. Security Council, Report of the Security Council Mission to Afghanistan, 11 to 16 November 
2006, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. S/2006/935 (Dec. 4, 2006). 
 247. See S.C. Res. 1386, supra note 232, ¶ 1; S.C. Res. 1413, supra note 240, ¶ 1; S.C. Res. 
57/1444, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1444 (Nov. 27, 2002); S.C. Res. 1510, supra note 244, ¶ 3; S.C. Res. 
59/1563, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1563 (Sept. 17, 2004); S.C. Res. 60/1623, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1623 
(Sept. 13, 2005); S.C. Res. 61/1659, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1659 (Feb. 15, 2006); S.C. Res. 61/1707, ¶ 1, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1707 (Sept. 12, 2006); S.C. Res. 62/1776, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1776 (Sept. 19, 
2007). 
 248. RASHID, supra note 54, at 173 (quoting Kofi Annan who describes the objective of U.N. 
peace-keeping operations to integrally include state and nation building).  
 249. NATO has conducted thousands of airstrikes on Taliban positions as part of its 
counterinsurgency measures. For example, NATO launched Operation Medusa in September 2006 to 
clear Panjwai. RASHID, supra note 54, at 363; see also US Opens ‘Major Afghan Offensive’, BBC 
NEWS, July 2, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8129789.stm (NATO‘s major offensive in 
Helmand province against the Taliban).  
 250. See GRAY, supra note 44, at 289–92. 
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are extremely important to analyze, discussion of them is outside the ambit 
of this Article.  
In contrast to ISAF, Operation Enduring Freedom was never authorized 
by the S.C.
251
 The United States, however, justifies the continued and 
indefinite presence of its forces and its actions under this operation on 
Afghan soil on the basis of exercising its right of self defense against 
terrorists responsible for the September 11 attacks.
252
 Routinely, U.S. 
forces preemptively attack insurgents or other militants classified by them 
as al-Qaeda members or their sympathizers, with the claimed objective of 
rooting out global terrorism.
253
 Collateral damage and civilian deaths in 
such military action and armed exchanges continue to be alarmingly 
high.
254
 The United States has been consistently criticized, at times even 
by the weak Afghan government that it helped institute, for wanton and 
reckless attacks that have to date claimed the lives of scores of innocent 
civilians.
255
 Moreover, U.S. forces working under the auspices of 
Operation Enduring Freedom have been accused of involvement in the 
extrajudicial killings of al-Qaeda members and Taliban fighters.
256
  
Numerous U.S. military prisons have been established in Afghanistan, 
with the Bagram Air Base facility alone holding over six hundred 
prisoners, the majority of whom are Afghan nationals.
257
 All of these 
 
 
 251. See Saura, supra note 42 (concluding that ―notwithstanding the attacks against the United 
States there can be no legal justification for Operation Enduring Freedom without the Council‘s 
explicit consent‖). 
 252. That the presence of U.S. forces in Afghanistan under Operation Enduring Freedom is 
justified on the basis of consent of the Afghanistan government, see Ronzitti, supra note 98, at 352, 
357–58. See Christine Gray, The Bush Doctrine Revisited: The 2006 National Security Strategy of the 
USA, 5 CHINESE J. INT‘L L. 555, 557 (2006) (―[I]t is not entirely clear whether the Security Council 
. . . accept[s] the legality of Operation Enduring Freedom because of the consent of the Afghan 
government to its presence and operations.‖); Saura, supra note 42, at 22, 26–27. 
 253. U.S. Military Claims 10 Taliban Killed in Afghanistan Clashes, KHALEEJ TIMES ONLINE, 
Nov. 26, 2008, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?section=international&xfile= 
data/international/2008/november/international_november1911.xml.  
 254. US to Review Afghan Air Strikes, BBC NEWS, May 11, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
south_asia/8042642.stm. 
 255. Id.; Afghanistan: US Investigation of Airstrike Deaths ‘Deeply Flawed‘, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, Jan. 15, 2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/01/15/afghanistan-us-investigation-air 
strike-deaths-deeply-flawed. 
 256. Robert Cryer, The Fine Art of Friendship: Jus in Bello in Afghanistan, 7 J. CONFLICT & 
SECURITY L. 37, 62–67 (2002). 
 257. Foreign Detainees ‘Have US Right’, BBC NEWS, Apr. 2, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
americas/7979885.stm; Ben Farmer, Philip Sherwell & Dean Nelson, Afghanistan’s ‘Guantanamo’ 
Poses New Prison Problem for Barack Obama, TELEGRAPH, Jan. 24, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co. 
uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/barackobama/4332499/Afghanistans-Guantanamo-poses-new-
prison-problem-for-Barack-Obama.html. Other similar facilities established by the United States 
include the Kandahar detention center at the Kandahar airport and at least a dozen sub-jails at U.S. fire 
bases in the mountains. See RASHID, supra note 54, at 298. 
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prisoners are being held without charge and without being accorded any 
due process of law.
258
 Many such detainees have been routinely subjected 
to torture,
259
 resulting in some reported deaths,
260
 while the culprits 
responsible for carrying out such abuses have escaped real 
accountability.
261
 Additionally, many private contractors have been given 
the authority to carry out interrogations of prisoners and run jails.
262
 Many 
of these individuals were bounty hunters and have been found guilty of 
torturing and murdering many Afghans who were in their custody.
263
 In 
violation of the Geneva Conventions, the United States avoids according 
these captives ―prisoner of war‖ status by classifying them as unlawful 
enemy combatants.
264
  
The practice of torture and extrajudicial killing is even more prevalent 
in the vast number of secret CIA prisons that are present in Afghanistan 
and elsewhere.
265
 These prisons are known as ―Black Sites‖ because of the 
complete lack of accountability and transparency of what transpires 
there.
266
 The occupation of Afghanistan by U.S. forces under the aegis of 
Operation Enduring Freedom, which many Afghans and critics view as a 
 
 
 258. Farmer, Sherwell & Nelson, supra note 257. 
 259. Duncan Campbell & Suzanne Goldenberg, Afghan Detainees Routinely Tortured and 
Humiliated by US Troops, GUARDIAN, June 23, 2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/jun/23/ 
usa.afghanistan3; see, e.g., Eric Schmitt, Pakistani Suspected of Qaeda Ties Is Held, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
5, 2008, at A6; HRCP Blasts US for Afia’s Custody, DAWN NEWS, Aug. 6, 2008, http://www.dawn. 
com/2008/08/06/nat10.htm. 
 260. At least eight Afghan prisoners have died in U.S. custody. RASHID, supra note 54, at 301–02; 
U.S. Military Pledges Afghan Prison Reform, BALT. SUN, June 15, 2004, http://www.baltimore 
sun.com/news/bal-te.afghan15jun15,0,3216889.story. 
 261. US: Failure To Provide Justice to Afghan Victims, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Feb. 14, 2007, 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/02/14/us-failure-provide-justice-afghan-victims. 
 262. RASHID, supra note 54, at 304. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Under article 4, section 1 of the Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, the Taliban qualifies as an integral part of the armed forces. Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4(1), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 
135; see AMNESTY INT‘L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: MEMORANDUM TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 
ON THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE IN U.S. CUSTODY IN AFGHANISTAN AND GUANTANAMO BAY 32 (2002), 
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR51/053/2002; see also John Cerone, Status 
of Detainees in International Armed Conflict, and their Protection in the Course of Criminal 
Proceedings, ASIL INSIGHTS, Jan. 2002, at n.4, http://www.asil.org/insigh81.cfm#_edn6 (―The lack of 
recognition of the Taleban by the U.S. would not appear to deprive Taleban fighters of POW status. 
Article 4(A)(3) includes ‗Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or 
an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power‘.‖). 
 265. RASHID, supra note 54, at 303–04; Secret Prison: Obama’s Order to Close ‘Black Sites’, 
GUARDIAN, Jan. 23, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/23/secret-prisons-closure-
obama-cia. 
 266. Examples include: the secret detention center located at the former Ariana hotel in central 
Kabul and the Salt Pit located at the brick factory on the outskirts of Kabul. See RASHID, supra note 
54, at 303–04. 
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belligerent occupation, is in violation of the law of occupation under 
international humanitarian law.
267
 U.S. forces are also guilty of blatantly 
disregarding and systematically contravening the international law of 
human rights.
268
  
The legality of Operation Enduring Freedom can also be challenged on 
the basis of article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Article 51 allows a state to act 
in self defense only until ―the S.C. has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security.‖269 With the establishment of a 
large and multilateral ISAF in Afghanistan mandated by the U.N. that 
exercises both peacekeeping and enforcement functions, the ―necessary 
measures‖ requirement relative to article 51 has been fulfilled. Therefore, 
the continued presence of U.S. forces in Afghanistan under Operation 
Enduring Freedom is unwarranted under the U.N. Charter.
270
 
With the progression of time, the mandates of peacekeeping and 
stabilization of ISAF, NATO, and the inchoate Operation Enduring 
Freedom are increasingly appearing façade-like, veiling attempts to 
neutralize insurgents who are opposed to the West-backed government in 
Afghanistan.  
III. THE LEGALITY OF U.S. DRONE ATTACKS IN PAKISTAN  
As part of its global War on Terror, U.S. Predator drone planes carry 
countless sorties over Pakistan and regularly bomb the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan with Hellfire missiles.
271
 Credible 
 
 
 267. Hague Convention IV (1907) art. 42 (―Territory is considered occupied when it is actually 
placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such 
authority has been established and can be exercised.‖); Third Geneva Convention, supra note 264, art. 
13 (―Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. Any unlawful act or omission by the 
Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its custody 
is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious breach of the present Convention.‖); see generally 
Harris, supra note 237. 
 268. AMNESTY INT‘L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: CRUEL AND INHUMAN: CONDITIONS OF 
ISOLATION FOR DETAINEES AT GUANTÁNAMO BAY (2007), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/ 
document.php?id=ENGAMR510512007&lang=e; see generally AMNESTY INT‘L, UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA: NO SUBSTITUTE FOR HABEAS CORPUS: SIX YEARS WITHOUT JUDICIAL REVIEW IN 
GUANTÁNAMO (2007), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/163/2007/en/ 
e7d8e267-d35e-11dd-a329-2f46302a8cc6/amr511632007en.html. 
 269. See U.N. Charter art. 51.  
 270. Hynes, supra note 182, at 686. 
 271. RASHID, supra note 54, at 97; Jeremy Page & Zahid Hussain, Obama Urged to Escalate 
Drone Bombing Raids Deep Into Pakistan, TIMES ONLINE, Mar. 19, 2009, http://www.timesonline. 
co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5934041.ece; Tom Coghlan, Zahid Hussain & Jeremy Page, Secrecy 
and Denial as Pakistan Lets CIA Use Airbase to Strike Militants, TIMES ONLINE, Feb. 17, 2009, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5755490.ece.  
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recent reports suggest that the U.S. administration is seriously considering 
expanding the scope of such attacks to other parts of Pakistan.
272
 The 
United States claims that these attacks effectively weaken the strength and 
resolve of Taliban insurgents and al-Qaeda fighters. While such targeted 
strikes have resulted in the killing of numerous high level operatives of al-
Qaeda,
273
 they have also resulted in the deaths of scores of innocent 
civilians, including women and children.
274
  
The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Yousuf Raza Gilani, has on numerous 
occasions officially condemned such attacks, and has termed them a 
violation of the sovereignty of Pakistan and a dangerous course of action 
that fuels militarism.
275
 He has urged the U.S. administration to 
immediately bring a halt to such operations.
276
 Recently, while responding 
to reports claiming that Pakistan had privately backed such operations and 
allowed the use of its airfields,
277
 the Prime Minister categorically denied 
any such agreement between the two nations.
278
 The legislative 
Parliamentary Committee on National Strategy echoed the same 
sentiment, calling for an immediate end to U.S. attacks on Pakistani soil 
and terming them a violation of the nation‘s territorial integrity.279 
 
 
 272. Page & Hussain, supra note 271. 
 273. CIA Drone Said to Kill Al-Qaida Operative, NBC NEWS, May 14, 2005, http://www. msnbc. 
msn.com/id/7847008/; see U.S. Airstrikes in Pakistan Called ‘Very Effective‘, CNN NEWS, May 18, 
2009, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/05/18/cia.pakistan.airstrikes/index.html. 
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12, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/2827257/Pakistani-fury-as-
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 275. Simon Hooper, Pakistan: U.S. Must Halt Drone Attacks, CNN NEWS, Jan. 29, 2009, http:// 
www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/01/28/davos.pakistan.pm/index.html; ‘Militant Deaths’ in US 
Drone Hit, BBC NEWS, July 3, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8131938.stm. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Coghlan, Hussain & Page, supra note 271. 
 278. Pakistan: U.S. Must Halt Drone Attacks, supra note 275 (―‗I want to put on record that we do 
not have any agreement between the government of the United States and the government of Pakistan,‘ 
Gilani told CNN‘s Christiane Amanpour in an interview . . . .‖). Even if the Pakistani military covertly 
acquiesces or collaborates with the Central Intelligence Agency (―C.I.A.‖) in the commission of the 
drone attacks, this contingency would not translate into an approval of such initiatives by the 
Government of Pakistan, which, in fact, vehemently opposes such operations. Pakistan Anger at US 
Drone Attack, SKY NEWS, Nov. 20, 2008, http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/World-News/Pakistan-
Condemns-US-Drone-Attacks-As-Taliban-Leader-Warns-Of-Reprisals-Within-The-Country/Article/ 
200811315156495?f=rss. In any case, the Pakistan Military and its intelligence agencies have a history 
of double dealings, covertly supporting Islamic fundamentalism and extremism in the region and 
working against the national interest of Pakistan and moreover constitutionally do not possess the legal 
capacity to enter into such tacit agreements. See PAK. CONST. (1973) art. 70(4) (―External affairs; the 
implementing of treaties and agreements, including educational and cultural pacts and agreements, 
with other countries; extradition, including the surrender of criminals and accused persons to 
Governments outside Pakistan.‖). 
 279. NA Committee Calls for End to Drone Attacks, DAWN NEWS, Apr. 7, 2009, http://www. 
dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/na-committee-calls-for-immed 
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Furthermore, U.S. drone attacks are hugely unpopular in the eyes of the 
Pakistani public. This public sentiment is on the rise as militant extremists 
from the tribal areas, including foreigners, have recently launched and 
threatened to launch serious acts of terrorism.
280
 These retaliatory acts to 
U.S. drone attacks in the frontier belt region of Pakistan
281
 have created 
havoc in the major metropolises of Pakistan, which have, until recently, 
been unaffected in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks.
282
 
A. Justifications for the Drone Attacks in Relation to the Right of Self 
Defense 
Whenever confronted by international media on the issue of the drone 
attacks as a violation of the sovereignty of Pakistan, the U.S. 
administration has generally been evasive in its response, but has stated 
that it would take out al-Qaeda members wherever they might be hiding.
283
 
Under the U.N. Charter, without a decision of the S.C. to use force under 
article 42, the only way the United States can unilaterally conduct armed 
operations on Pakistani soil, without the latter‘s consent, is if it is 
legitimately acting in self defense.
284
 However, the United States has not 
reported its carrying out of drone attacks on Pakistani territory to the S.C. 
as an exercise of this right of self defense as mandated by article 51.
285
  
The justifications for the U.S. drone attacks on Pakistan are convoluted 
and are hard to sustain under international law. They are primarily based 
on arguments supporting preemptive or reactionary attacks against non-
state actors.
286
 Interestingly, as enunciated earlier, both preemptive attacks 
 
 
iate-end-to-drone-attacks--bi. 
 280. Lahore, supra note 58; Pakistan: U.S. Must Halt Drone Attacks, supra note 275. 
 281. Lahore, supra note 58. 
 282. See, e.g., United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, USCIRF Annual 
Report 2008—Pakistan, May 1, 2008, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48556999c.html (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2009) (―Hundreds of people have been killed, including in the city of Lahore, which 
until recently was largely unaffected by extremist violence.‖). 
 283. Obama Continues Bush Policy of Deadly Air Strikes in Pakistan, DEMOCRACY NOW, Jan. 30, 
2009, http://www.democracynow.org/2009/1/30/obama_continues_bush_policy_of_deadly. 
 284. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 285. See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 105 (―[F]or the purpose of enquiry into the customary law 
position, the absence of a report may be one of the factors indicating whether the State in question was 
itself convinced that it was acting in self-defence.‖). See DINSTEIN, supra note 74, at 216 (―[T]he duty 
of reporting becomes a substantive condition and a limitation on the exercise of self-defence.‖); see 
also P.S Reichler & D. Wippman, United States Armed Intervention in Nicaragua: A Rejoinder, 11 
YALE J. INT‘L L. 462, 471 (1986). 
 286. Sheharyar Khan, US Drone Attacks Destabilizing Pakistan: Winning Hearts and Minds Has 
Failed, IslamOnline.net, July 30, 2009, http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_ 
C&pagename=Zone-English-Muslim_Affairs%2FMAELayout&cid=1248187501549; see Timothy 
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and reprisals, especially in the context of terrorism, have not received 
international recognition as a legitimate use of force for self defense.
287
  
The primary purpose of the United States in carrying out these drone 
attacks is, as seen by many, an attempt to kill senior members of both al-
Qaeda and Afghanistan‘s Taliban leadership, who hide in the mountainous 
frontier region of Pakistan and are provided safe haven by homegrown 
Pakistani Taliban or tribal militia leaders sympathetic to their cause.
288
 
Even though the drone attacks have often targeted senior members of 
Pakistani-based Taliban and tribal militias,
289
 it is only now becoming 
clear that such membership is also being systematically targeted in its own 
right.
290
  
At this juncture, it is necessary to closely examine the basis of U.S. 
targeted strikes in Pakistan against all three delineated groups under 
Operation Enduring Freedom. U.S. targeted strikes on al-Qaeda 
membership, including foreign militants of Central Asian and Middle 
Eastern origin associated with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, are primarily 
preemptive in nature, with the aim to exterminate their leadership in order 
to extirpate these networks and thus prevent future terrorist attacks.
291
 
However, the attacks on the top brass of al-Qaeda are also viewed as 
reprisals for the original attacks of September 11, 2001 on U.S. soil.
292
  
Attacks on Afghani Taliban are carried out to neutralize its leadership, 
which the United States claims commands and controls insurgents fighting 
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 287. See GRAY, supra note 44, at 197–98, 212. 
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Movement in Afghanistan, at 44 (1996) (unpublished masters thesis, U.S. Army), available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA428904&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf. 
 289. Pakistani Taliban Chief Dodged Missile, MSNBC, June 24, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn. 
com/id/31529016/ns.  
 290. Ismail Khan, Baitullah Mehsud is Dead, DAWN NEWS, Aug. 8, 2009, http://www.dawn. com/ 
wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/04-intelligence-sources-have-confirmed-
baitullah-death-fm-qureshi-qs-06. 
 291. Gareth Porter, Pakistan: US Drone Attacks Weaken Government’s Hold, HUFFINGTON POST, 
Apr. 16, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/15/pakistan-us-drone-attacks_n_187305.html 
(―Ambassador James Dobbins, the director of National Security Studies at the Rand Corporation . . . 
told IPS in an interview that the drone strikes in Pakistan are aimed ‗in the short and medium term‘ at 
the counter-terrorism objective of preventing attacks on Washington and other capitals.‖). 
 292. Romesh Ratnesar, The Hunt for Osama bin Laden, TIME, Nov. 26, 2001, at 40 (―American F-
15Es, unmanned Predator drones and commando ground troops killed scores of Taliban and al-Qaeda 
lieutenants, including bin Laden deputy Mohammed Atef, the reputed architect of the Sept. 11 
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News10239-16_killed_in_US_drone_attack.aspx. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss1/4
  
 
 
 
 
2010] WAR ON TERRORISM 117 
 
 
 
 
against U.S. forces across the border in Afghanistan.
293
 The United States 
also claims that these commanders often cross back into Afghanistan to 
engage in hostile operations against U.S. forces.
294
 Local tribal militia 
leaders in Pakistan and Pakistani Taliban commanders are principally 
targeted by U.S. drones because of the logistical, weapon supply, and safe 
haven support they provide to the other two groups.
295
  
The United States classifies all of the groups as terrorists and thus 
within the purview of its global War on Terror. In reality, however, those 
targeted have very different agendas and modes of operation, albeit with 
some overlap at times.
296
 The real objective of foreign militants of Middle 
Eastern or Central Asian citizenship affiliated with al-Qaeda or other sister 
organizations is grounded in a civilizational and ideological battle against 
U.S. forces wherever possible as part of the perceived holy war or Jihad.
297
 
The primary objective of Talibani insurgents and their leadership, who had 
previously controlled most of Afghanistan, is to regain power in 
Afghanistan and re-institute their purist version of an Islamic state.
298
 
Pakistan-based militant extremists and insurgents are sympathetic toward 
the ousted Taliban regime and support its fight to rid Afghanistan of U.S. 
occupation, but the extremists‘ main goal is to create a purist state within 
the state of Pakistan similar to Afghanistan‘s government under Taliban 
control. They plan to govern and control such a state under a system of 
government derived from an amalgamation of Islamic radicalism, 
fundamentalism, and Pashtunwali tribal customs.
299
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2008, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%05%24%story_24-5-2008_pg7_57. 
 295. RASHID, supra note 54, at 265; U.S. Drone Attack Kills Militant in Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, 
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5 CHINA AND EURASIA FORUM Q. 93, 118 (2007); Seth G. Jones, Going the Distance, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 15, 2009, at B1 (―Some, like al-Qaeda, have a broad global agenda that includes fighting the 
United States and its allies (the far enemy) and overthrowing Western-friendly regimes in the Middle 
East (the near enemy) to establish a pan-Islamic caliphate.‖). 
 298. Jones, supra note 297 (―Others, like the Taliban and the Haqqani network, are focused on 
Afghanistan and on re-establishing their extremist ideology there.‖). 
 299. See supra notes 8–11; Editorial, Taliban, Pakistan and Modernity, DAILY TIMES, Mar. 29, 
2006, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006\03\29\story_29-3-2006_pg3_1 (―The 
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Though al-Qaeda and the Taliban have an alliance of sorts, their modes 
of operation are actually quite distinct from one another. Whereas al-
Qaeda‘s aim is to inflict maximum harm upon the United States anywhere 
in the world by whatever means possible even if it involves the killing of 
innocent civilians,
300
 Taliban insurgents are principally engaged with U.S. 
forces in an armed conflict involving guerilla warfare and recently, even 
conventional warfare, in an effort to regain control over Afghanistan.
301
 
Frequently, however, the Taliban have kidnapped or killed foreign aid 
workers and contractors, and have often utilized tactics that would be 
classified as terrorism, such as suicide attacks that also kill scores of 
innocent Afghani civilians.
302
 It does not seem, however, that the Afghan 
Taliban are systematically involved in carrying out, or even have the 
capacity to carry out, terrorist, or for that matter, any attacks on U.S. soil, 
against U.S. civilians not present in Afghanistan, or against U.S. assets 
abroad.
303
 Moreover, the Afghan Taliban‘s hostile engagement with U.S. 
forces and other foreign troops under ISAF is localized within the Pak-
Afghan region.
304
 
Taliban insurgents ostensibly see this as a war of liberation against an 
unlawful occupation of their country, quite similar to their perception of 
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan a few decades back, when they were 
actively supported by the United States.
305
 Often the fighting between U.S. 
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carried out in whichever country‘ . . . .‖). 
 301. Taliban Using Guerrilla Tactics Against US, UK, NATION, July 4, 2009, http://www.nation. 
com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/International/04-Jul-2009/Taliban-using-guerril
la-tactics-against-US-UK; see generally Saeed Shah & Nancy A. Youssef, Are Taliban Abandoning 
Guerrilla Tactics in Pakistan Conflict?, MCCLATCHY WASH. BUREAU, May 15, 2009, http://www. 
mcclatchydc.com/world/story/68314.html. 
 302. Taliban Kidnap 23 South Koreans in Afghanistan, DAILY TIMES, July 21, 2007, http://www. 
dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C07%5C21%5Cstory_21-7-2007_pg7_1; Suicide Bomber 
Kills Five, Wounds 17 in Afghanistan, DAILY TIMES, Apr. 10, 2009, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/ 
default.asp?page=2009%5C04%5C10%5Cstory_10-4-2009_pg7_48. 
 303. See On the Loose Taliban Would Boost International Terrorism: Intelligence Officials, supra 
note 296. 
 304. See id.; see generally RASHID, supra note 54, at 349–73. 
 305. Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, The Oily Americans, TIME, May 13, 2003, http://www. 
time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,450997,00.html; ANGELO RASANAYAGAM, AFGHANISTAN: A 
MODERN HISTORY: MONARCHY, DESPOTISM OR DEMOCRACY? THE PROBLEMS OF GOVERNANCE IN 
THE MUSLIM TRADITION, 105 (2003). 
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forces and Taliban insurgents involves Taliban responding to preemptive 
and proactive attacks initiated by U.S. forces.
306
 In light of these facts, it is 
hard to see how the Taliban actions against U.S. forces could be classified 
as acts of terrorism against the United States, especially when, unlike 
September 11, no attacks are conducted on U.S. soil or against U.S. 
civilians, but are instead against U.S. forces during active combat 
operations.  
U.S. drone attacks carried out in Pakistan against al-Qaeda members, 
both Afghani and Pakistani Taliban, and militia leadership as preemptive 
self defense against terrorism rest on a justification unrecognized in 
international law. On the other hand, if these attacks are acts of reprisal, 
they are unlawful under international law.
307
 As discussed, it is quite 
tenuous to argue that the Afghan Taliban are engaged in terrorism against 
the United States when they are guilty of terrorism against Afghan 
civilians. In the same vein, Pakistani Taliban are guilty of terrorism 
against Pakistan and not the United States. As will be discussed 
subsequently, one must reject any U.S. justifications for attacking such 
groups unilaterally on the premise of fighting global terrorism. 
Consequently, the only group left that the United States might argue for 
attacking on the basis of preemptive self defense against terrorism aimed 
at itself, is genuine al-Qaeda membership residing in Pakistan. 
By attacking non-state actors on Pakistani soil, however, the United 
States is carrying out armed attacks on Pakistan, which can only be 
defended if terrorist acts of such non-state actors residing in Pakistan 
qualify as armed attacks against the United States under article 51, and if 
Pakistan itself was guilty of sponsoring such terrorist activities. Such a 
level of state involvement is necessary as repeatedly indicated in I.C.J. 
judgments.
308
 Besides, when the United States carries out drone attacks in 
Pakistan preemptively or as reprisals, it is quite incongruent to argue that 
the United States is acting in self defense, because, in the case of 
preemptive attacks no armed attack has been committed, and with regard 
to reprisals armed attacks have already ended. 
 
 
 306. Ijaz Hussain, Editorial, An Unwinnable War?, DAILY TIMES, Oct. 22, 2008, http://www. 
dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C10%5C22%5Cstory_22-10-2008_pg3_2 (―[I]nsurgency 
in Afghanistan is not terrorism, but a war of national liberation as seen by the Pashtun population on 
both sides of the Durand Line.‖); Rasul Bakhsh Rais, Editorial, War for Peace?, DAILY TIMES, Feb. 
17, 2009, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009%5C02%5C17%5Cstory_17-2-2009_ 
pg3_2. 
 307. See supra note 147. 
 308. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 103; Wall Construction, 43 I.L.M. 1009, 1050. 
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The State of Pakistan has not indulged in the necessary level of 
sponsorship of al-Qaeda or Afghani Taliban operations by directing, 
controlling, or commanding the juntas.
309
 It does not exercise ―effective 
control‖310 or ―overall control‖311 over such outfits. In fact, even the level 
of support provided to such outfits by non-state actors of Pakistani origin 
located within Pakistan—such as Pakistani Taliban and tribal militias—
does not rise to the level of sponsorship that requires control of al-Qaeda 
or the Afghan Taliban. It is, at most, a level of support that involves 
provision of weapons, logistics and safe haven. Such support under the 
Nicaragua and the Congo judgments is not the sort of assistance that 
would be enough to qualify as an ―armed attack.‖312  
Both Nicaragua and Congo set forth the level of state involvement 
required to effectuate an armed attack by expounding upon the requisite 
intensity of actual control over non-state actors, such as contras and rebels, 
by the state itself.
313
 In a situation, as in the present case, where non-state 
actors provide assistance to one another, the nexus between these two 
groups is irrelevant for purposes of determining an armed attack, as there 
is an absence of state involvement, which is a necessary condition for the 
presence of an ―armed attack‖ as determined by the I.C.J. Though 
historically both Pakistan and the United States have condoned the Taliban 
and arguably elements within al-Qaeda in the not too distant past,
314
 
Pakistan is not at present sponsoring the activities of al-Qaeda as per the 
international law of armed conflict. In fact, Pakistan formally took a 
belligerent stance towards the Afghan Taliban after September 11 and has 
recently overtly moved against domestic Taliban. Though initially 
hesitant, Pakistani armed forces are currently in the process of conducting 
an intense and aggressive armed operation to neutralize local Taliban 
insurgents and other extremist groups within the country‘s territory.315  
 
 
 309. Shah, supra note 21, at 159. Factual determinations aside, logically speaking it would be 
absurd to argue that Pakistan, while directly sponsoring al-Qaeda, would concurrently be termed and 
be seen by the United States as an important ally in its war on terror as has been the case in the last 
decade. 
 310. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 64–65. 
 311. Tadić, 38 I.L.M. 1518, 1518. 
 312. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 126–27; Congo, 2005 I.C.J. 1, 53. 
 313. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 126–27, 64–65; Congo, 2005 I.C.J. 1, 53.  
 314. RASHID, supra note 54, at 14–17. 
 315. Abdul Sami Paracha, Taliban Stronghold in Orakzai Shelled, DAWN NEWS, July 4, 2009, 
http://www.dawnnews.tv/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/03-army-heli 
copters-attack-militants-near-crash-site-ss-02; Pakistani Forces Drive Taliban From Key Town, CNN 
NEWS, Apr. 29, 2009, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/04/29/pakistan.taliban.fighting/ 
index.html?iref=newssearch. Pakistan lacks overall control over local Taliban and insurgents blamed 
for providing safe haven to al-Qaeda, and is far from exercising overall control over al-Qaeda and its 
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Recently, C.I.A. reports indicate that some operatives of Pakistan‘s 
Inter-Services Intelligence agency (―ISI‖) have re-established links with 
Afghan militants of the 1990s and are, for instance, tipping off militants 
before U.S. drone attacks are carried out on Pakistani soil.
316
 Such claims 
are based on assertions that raise concerns of divided loyalties within the 
Pakistani military establishment and its intelligence agencies.
317
 Yet others 
opine that the Pakistani military is institutionally and strategically 
compelled to support the Taliban movement at a particular level and 
therefore continues to assist it in covert ways.
318
 There might be some 
 
 
sister organizations under the Tadić test. Carin Zissis, Pakistan’s Tribal Areas, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS, http://www.cfr.org/publication/11973/pakistans_tribal_areas.html (last visited Nov. 20, 
2009) (―Islamabad historically has had minimal control over the fiercely independent Pashtuns.‖).  
 316. See supra note 272. However, some scholars, like the prominent Pakistani journalist, Ahmed 
Rashid, are of the view that the ISI is guilty of duplicity concerning the War on Terror and has 
provided unstinted and systematic support to Taliban and other extremists all along. 
 317. Gary Thomas, US Pressure Deepens Divide Between Pakistan’s Military and Civilian 
Leadership, VOA NEWS, Oct. 1, 2008, http://www.voanews.com/english/index.cfm (search ―US 
Pressure Deepens‖, then choose the options for articles older than thirty days and ―Exact Match‖, then 
change search dates to include Oct. 1, 2008 and follow ―Search VOA English‖). Many in the top brass 
of the Pakistan armed forces are deeply religious and conjecturally sympathetic to Islamic 
fundamentalism. Anwar Iqbal, US Generals Turn Their Guns on ISI, DAWN NEWS, Mar. 29, 2009, 
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/front-page/us-gen 
erals-turn-their-guns-on-isi. Moreover, a large segment of the Pakistani military and intelligence 
establishment distrusts the real motives of the United States and feels that their own involvement in 
cracking down on radicals will greatly undermine the Kashmir cause. Many still feel that a Taliban-run 
Afghanistan would provide the necessary strategic depth to counter India and view it, rather than the 
Taliban, as the biggest national security threat to Pakistan. See Taliban’s Is Pakistan Best Bet to 
Counter India’s Increasing Regional Influence: US Experts, THAINDIAN NEWS, Apr. 9, 2009, 
http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/south-asia/taliban-is-pakistans-best-bet-to-counter-indias-increa
sing-regional-influence-us-experts_100177386.html; Simon & Stevenson, supra note 20; RASHID, 
supra note 54, at 25. 
 318. Many Pakistani generals and higher-ranking intelligence officers saw the United States‘ 
commencement of and concentration on the war in Iraq as an indication of its disinterest in dealing 
with the Taliban effectively. For these officers, this behavior was reminiscent of how the United States 
deserted Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal from the country in the 1980s. RASHID, supra note 
54, at 335. Thus, for strategic reasons many in the military and the intelligence establishment feel a 
need to maintain back channels with the Taliban, who they feel will continue to play a pivotal role in 
the running of Afghanistan in the near future. This belief can be substantiated by the fact that recently, 
even the U.S. administration has expressed a serious desire to engage with the Taliban militants in 
Afghanistan in order to achieve a political compromise. Anwar Iqbal & Masood Haider, US Willing to 
Hold Talks with Taliban, Says Report, DAWN NEWS, Oct. 29, 2008, http://www.dawn.com/2008/ 
10/29/top4.htm; Hannah Cooper, Obama Announces Intention to Negotiate with the Taliban, 
OPENDEMOCRACY.NET, Mar. 9, 2009, http://www.opendemocracy.net/terrorism/article/security_ 
briefings/090309. The assertion that Pakistan maintains ties with certain Afghani militant leaders is 
credible in the case of certain militants of Pashtun descent who have historically been supported and 
loyal to the Pakistan military. For instance, the case of the former prime minister of Afghanistan, 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who is fighting to end the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan and has been termed 
a terrorist by the United States, comes to mind. Mark Mazzetti & Eric Schmitt, Afghan Strikes by 
Taliban Get Pakistan Help, U.S. Aides Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/03/26/world/asia/26tribal.html. Moreover, the massive presence of Indian forces and intelligence 
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truth to these claims;
319
 however, the level and quality of assistance that 
Pakistan is currently accused of furnishing to the Taliban is not 
qualitatively of the sort that can be termed as an armed attack by Pakistan 
against the United States under international law. Moreover, as indicated 
earlier, it is tenuous to argue that the status of Afghani and local militants 
or insurgents is equivalent to that of al-Qaeda members for purposes of 
proclaiming the right of self defense on the basis of terrorist acts against 
the United States. 
B. U.S. Drone Attacks in Pakistan and the Customary International Law 
of Self Defense 
The United States cannot justify the legitimacy of its drone attacks on 
Pakistani territory on the basis of self defense. Even if one were to assume 
that such use of force is legitimate, the United States is still required to 
comply with the customary international law requirements of immediacy, 
necessity, and proportionality under the Caroline paradigm.
320
 For 
purposes of immediacy and necessity, the customary rule laid out by 
Daniel Webster requires an instant and overwhelming danger leaving no 
choice of means or moments of deliberation for a state to respond.
321
  
The United States does not yet find itself in such threatening 
circumstances when it conducts drone attacks in the Pakistani tribal belt 
region. In fact, such attacks are conducted after intensive intelligence 
gathering and deliberation and have continued for years.
322
 There is no 
instant or overwhelming danger posed to the United States if it does not 
conduct such attacks in Pakistan. These attacks are in fact preemptive 
 
 
units in Afghanistan threatens most in the Pakistan army who suspect India‘s nefarious designs to 
destabilize or even fragment Pakistan. Proof of India’s Involvement in Militancy Found, DAWN NEWS, 
Nov. 3, 2009, http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/ 
13+proof+of+indian+hand+south+waziristan+army-za-02; Rehman Malik Presents ‘Proof of Indian 
Hand in Unrest’, DAWN NEWS, Apr. 24, 2009, http://www.dawn.com.pk/wps/wcm/connect/ dawn-
content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/malik-presents-proof-of-indian-hand-in-unrest--bi. Many believe 
that India is arming and actively assisting terrorists and insurgents in order to foment separatism in 
Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province (―N.W.F.P.‖). RASHID, supra note 54, at 283, 286. 
Analysts Say India Fanning Unrest in Balochistan, DAILY TIMES, Apr. 7, 2009, http://www.dailytimes. 
com.pk/default.asp?page=2009%5C04%5C07%5Cstory_7-4-2009_pg7_30. See, e.g., Salik Malik, The 
Real Story Behind Islamabad Marriott Hotel Attack, PAKISTAN DAILY, Sept. 23, 2008, http://www. 
daily.pk/politics/politicalnews/7434-the-real-story-behind-islamabad-marriott-hotel-attack. html. 
 319. RASHID, supra note 54, at 337.  
 320. Caroline Paradigm, supra note 106.  
 321. Id. 
 322. Asif Haroon Raja, The Real Story Behind Marriott Attack, ASIAN TRIBUNE, Sept. 22, 2008, 
at 2, available at http://www.ahmedquraishi.com/article_detail.php?id=465 (―The phenomenon of 
missile attacks by drones commenced in January 2006 . . . .‖). 
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strikes that aim to weaken al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the long-term by 
neutralizing their leadership, and thus, are just one of the many measures 
that the United States undertakes to achieve its inchoate long-term 
objectives that have little to do with self defense as recognized under 
international law. This determination is further evinced from the presence 
of the controversial Bush Doctrine and the 2006 U.S. National Security 
Strategy,
323
 both of which disregard principles of international law 
constraining the use of force.
324
  
The U.S. use of force in self defense in the form of targeted drone 
strikes on Pakistan is impermissible because they are unnecessary, as 
other, peaceful means of facing the threat have not been exhausted given 
the time parameters involved. After years of bombing FATA with the 
Government of Pakistan officially and consistently protesting such attacks, 
the U.S. administration has only recently formally shown a willingness to 
conduct joint operations with Pakistan in these tribal areas.
325
 Even though 
Pakistan has rejected this particular offer with its lopsided terms, it has 
confirmed that it is more than willing to conduct such targeted strikes 
itself when provided with the requisite intelligence, drones, and 
missiles.
326
 The United States, however, has ignored this proposition and 
continues to violate the territorial integrity of Pakistan without showing 
any real willingness to negotiate a compromise under which Pakistan is 
given a real chance to effectively deal with militarism thriving within its 
borders, absent U.S. armed unilateralism.  
 
 
 323. Both the Bush Doctrine and the 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy sanction a level of 
preemptive self defense that allows the right to use force against non-imminent threats against both 
state and non-state actors contrary to international law. Such use of force has proven to be ―extremely 
controversial‖ and overwhelmingly regarded as unlawful reprisals. GRAY, supra note 44, at 208. 
Moreover, the 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy does not mention international law on the use of 
force and shows ―a lack of respect for international law . . . [fails] to acknowledge a role for the U.N. 
and [allows for the] express identification of rogue states.‖ Gray, supra note 252, at 564. See GRAY, 
supra note 44, at 212, 218. 
 324. See generally Gray, supra note 252. 
 325. Posting of Bridget Johnson to Report: Pakistan Rejects U.S. Plan, Wants Drones, 
http://thehill.com/leading-the-news/report-pakistan-rejects-u.s.-plan-wants-drones-2009-04-08.html 
(Apr. 8, 2009, 11:56 EST). 
 326. President Asif Ali Zardari Replies to Questions from The Independent, INDEPENDENT NEWS, 
Apr. 8, 2009, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/president-asif-ali-zardari-replies-to-quest 
ions-from-the-independent-1665034.html; see also ‘No’ to Joint Operation in Tribal Areas, DAWN 
NEWS, Apr. 8, 2009, http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakis 
tan/us-to-respect-pakistans-sovereignty-qureshi-ha. For a discussion of U.S. hesitancy in sharing such 
drones, missiles and associated technology, see Pakistan Foreign Minister Pushes US for Drones, BAY 
LEDGER NEWS ZONE, Apr. 25, 2009, http://www.blnz.com/news/2009/02/25/Pakistan_foreign_ 
minister_pushes_drones_5124.html. 
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As has been historically proven, the United States also has the 
capability of coercing the Pakistani Government, and more importantly, its 
armed forces,
327
 which have until recently tackled the Taliban threat rather 
sluggishly, to deal more effectively with militarism. The Pakistani 
Government and military are heavily dependent on U.S. economic and 
military aid for survival.
328
 The United States holds immense diplomatic 
sway with Pakistan, and it also can successfully use the S.C. mechanism to 
pressure Pakistan into using force more aggressively against militant 
extremists under the mandate of international law, such as through the 
promulgation of a binding S.C. resolution under Chapter VII.  
The use of force is unnecessary in self defense when, rather than 
diminishing the dangers involved, the gravity of the threat posed is 
augmented by the use of force. U.S. drone attacks exacerbate the threat of 
terrorism, both from a regional and global perspective, and intensely 
strengthen militancy and insurgency in the troubled Pak-Afghan region. 
The War on Terror that prompted U.S. military adventurism in the region 
has proven to be a blessing in disguise for extremist and militants groups. 
U.S. attacks have given birth to an unprecedented level of resentment and 
anger among the tribal populace, which has been craftily exploited by 
fanatical factions through organized propaganda to successfully recruit 
thousands of disillusioned and impressionable young fighters for their 
causes. Consequently, these burgeoning violent movements embedded in 
religious fanaticism have dangerously engulfed many parts of Pakistan 
propagating insurgency, civil unrest, and terrorism. 
U.S. drone attacks are no different in causing this level of resentment 
and anger, and they have provided impetus to extremist recruitment and 
 
 
 327. As discussed earlier, there are many reasons why military and intelligence agencies are 
hesitant to move forcefully against the Taliban. The presence of rogue elements within such 
institutions cannot be discounted. ‘Kayani has Purged Rogue Elements from ISI’, REDIFF NEWS, May 
22, 2009, http://news.rediff.com/report/2009/may/22/us-kayani-cleared-isi-of-rogues.htm. 
Additionally, another reason for inaction is blamed on the military and intelligence agencies looking 
out for their own interest rather than that of the nation. See generally Ex-official: US Has Rogue 
Elements in ISI, PRESS TV, Aug. 5, 2008, http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=65653&sectionid= 
351020401. For all these reasons, it is imperative that the U.S. administration deal with the democratic 
and civilian government of Pakistan rather than empowering the military and its intelligence outfits 
that have a history of misusing authority. 
 328. See RASHID, supra note 54, at 31; Manzur Ejaz, Op-Ed., Washington Diary: Conditional Aid, 
DAILY TIMES, Jan. 14, 2009, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page= 2009/01/14/story_14-1-
2009_pg3_3. The Obama administration has appropriately attached conditions on the disbursement of 
aid in the amount of 1.5 billion over the next five years based on how effectively Pakistan deals with 
Taliban and al-Qaeda, among other benchmarks. Anwar Iqbal, New Conditions Incorporated into 
Pakistan Aid Bill, DAWN NEWS, Apr. 10, 2009, http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-
content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/front-page/new-conditions-incorporated-into-pakistan-aid-bill.  
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bolstered the resolve of militants. The resulting aggressiveness is apparent 
from recent terrorist attacks conducted by extremists in secure 
metropolises of Pakistan distant from the tribal areas, as retribution for the 
drone attacks.
329
 For instance, Baitullah Mehsud, the deceased leader of 
Tehrik-e-Taliban,
330
 the umbrella organization of all Pakistani Taliban 
outfits, had threatened that his fighters would continue to undertake 
terrorist attacks in secure parts of Pakistan on a weekly basis as reprisal for 
the continuing drone attacks.
331
 This proxy fight between the United States 
and the militants within Pakistan is dangerously destabilizing the country 
and increasing the dangers of international terrorism to all nations, 
including the United States. Therefore, the necessity of the drone attacks 
for eliminating the threat of terrorism emanating out of the tribal areas of 
Pakistan is highly questionable.  
It must also be understood that U.S. drone operations in Pakistan are 
not proportional in relation to the wrong it suffered.
332
 It is inappropriate to 
measure the wrong suffered by the United States on the fateful day of 
September 11 in relation to the drone attacks being carried out in Pakistan 
today nearly a decade later, not only because of intervening events and the 
long passage of time, but also because of the partial disconnect between 
those responsible for the September 11 attacks and those being targeted. In 
any case, the attacked state of Pakistan was not itself involved in the 
commission of the September 11 attacks on the United States. If the wrong 
suffered is being measured in terms of the costs borne by the United States 
and its armed forces associated with its occupation embattling insurgents 
and militants in the restive regions of Afghanistan bordering Pakistan, then 
the author is highly skeptical on whether such wrong could be classified as 
legally sufficient for purposes of a legitimate exercise of the right of self 
defense against Pakistan under international law.  
 
 
 329. Saeed Shah, Pakistani Taliban Claim Police Academy Attack, GUARDIAN, Apr. 1, 2009, at 1 
of ―international pages‖ (internet version of article available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/ 
2009/mar/31/pakistan-taliban-lahore-police-attack); Peace Deal to Remain Intact, But Revenge Attacks 
Likely: Taliban, DAILY TIMES, Nov. 21, 2008, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page= 
2008%5C11%5C21%5Cstory_21-11-2008_pg7_28. 
 330. RASHID, supra note 54, at 386 (Baitullah Masud was appointed as the Amir (leader) of the 
Tehrik-e-Taliban in December, 2007 by the consensus of 40 militia–extremist commanders).  
 331. Taliban Threaten 2 Attacks Per Week in Pak, TIMES OF INDIA, Apr. 6, 2009, available at 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/World/Pakistan/Taliban-threaten-2-attacks-per-week-in-Pak/article 
show/4364184.cms. Baitullah Mehsud was killed in a U.S. drone attack. Declan Walsh, Pakistan’s Top 
Taliban Leader Baitullah Mehsud Killed in US Drone Attack, GUARDIAN, Aug. 7, 2009, http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/07/taliban-leader-baitullah-mehsud-killed.  
 332. ERICKSON, supra note 111, at 146. 
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Additionally, if the U.S. drone attacks are carried out on a preemptive 
basis against the amorphous threat of global terrorism, then the wrong has 
yet to come into existence or is at best conceptual in nature. Moreover, 
global terrorism is, by definition, a wrong suffered by the entire world 
community, and if any one state was allowed to use it as a basis to attack 
other states then the whole system of international relations would risk 
disintegration.  
U.S. drone attacks are also not proportional ―in terms of the nature and 
amount of force employed to achieve the objectives and goals.‖333 First, 
goals and objectives must be valid and relate to the removal of an actual 
danger posed. As mentioned, the goals alluded to by the U.S. 
administration as justification for carrying out drone attacks are both 
undefined and incapable of achievement though armed aggression.
334
  
Second, the intensity and frequency with which these drone attacks 
have been carried out over the past three years have resulted in the 
unnecessary killing of hundreds of civilians and needless destruction of 
infrastructure.
335
 Importantly, drone attacks are carried out by unmanned 
robotically controlled planes whose targeted strikes are determined by 
intelligence, which has often proved quite faulty in retrospect.
336
 Without a 
pilot, who potentially has a better ability to distinguish between civilian 
and militant targets at the time of a strike, drones lack the capability to, on 
site, factor in the fact that civilians and militants reside coterminously in 
the vicinity of the planned attack. This explains why ―between January 14, 
2006 and April 8, 2009, only 10 [strikes] were able to hit their actual 
targets, killing 14 wanted al-Qaeda leaders, besides perishing 687 innocent 
Pakistani civilians. The success percentage of the U.S. Predator strikes 
thus comes to not more than six per cent.‖337  
 
 
 333. Shah, supra note 21, at 176; ERICKSON, supra note 111, at 46. 
 334. White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 22 (Feb. 14, 2003), available at 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/goals.pdf; 
MOECKLI, supra note 159, at 47 (U.S justification is to eradicate the threat of international terrorism, 
which is an undefined concept under international law). Moreover, drone attacks have increased rather 
than reduced the threat of armed retaliation from Taliban and al-Qaeda members. Lahore, supra note 
58. See Hooper, supra note 275.  
 335. Suspected U.S. Strike Kills 13 in North Waziristan, DAWN NEWS, Apr. 4, 2009, 
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/nwfp/13-killed-in-
suspected-us-drone-attack--il. 
 336. Gareth Porter, Errant Drone Attacks Spur Militants in Pakistan, IPS, Apr. 15, 2009, 
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=46511; 60 Drone Hits Kill 14 Al-Qaeda Men, 687 Civilians, 
NEWS, Apr. 10, 2009, http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=21440. 
 337. 60 Drone Hits Kill 14 Al-Qaeda Men, 687 Civilians, supra note 336. 
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CONCLUSION 
The dangers from the Taliban movement are real. Fostering an 
environment of repression and intolerance, the Talibanization of society in 
the Pak-Afghan regions has created a level of anarchy that challenges the 
very fabric of society and must be halted before irreparable harm results. 
One must be absolutely clear that the dangers of this transformation in a 
moderate society are most damaging not only for Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, but also for the adjoining states in the region.  
Recognizing the problem, however, is part of the solution. Tackling 
Talibanization requires a multi-faceted approach that apart from 
recognizing the reasons behind the process, also mandates addressing all 
root causes fueling such radicalism and militarism
338
 comprehensively, 
and as much as possible, peacefully. Such an approach is consonant with 
the newly conceptualized human security paradigm that focuses on the 
protection of the person, rather than the state, through promotion of 
sustainable development, equality, political and economic security, and the 
alleviation of poverty in troubled regions.
339
 Support from the international 
community in this endeavor would go far in stabilizing radicalized tribal 
societies and would, in turn, make it practically impossible for the 
anathema of terrorism to thrive in this part of the world. This is the only 
way to win the so-called ―War on Terror.‖ Therefore the situation in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan mandates an approach primarily centered on the 
peaceful resolution of all disputes, the fostering of nation-building through 
political dialogue and compromise,
340
 the strengthening of democracy, and 
the supremacy of the rule of law.
341
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 339.  
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Use of force, which is surely required in particular instances, must be 
applied as a last resort and must also be limited in duration and scope. 
Such use of force should remain the prerogative of the domestic state 
unless its refusal to act is proving to be a threat to international peace and 
security as determined by the whole international community 
multilaterally, for only the domestic state is accountable for its actions to 
democratic institutions and its citizens. Moreover, armed force generally 
targets the symptoms of a diseased state of affairs rather than tackling the 
root causes themselves and, as has been historically witnessed, causes 
more damage in the long-run.
342
 The situation in the Pak-Afghan tribal 
region is no different where violence begot even more violence, especially 
when use of force was employed by foreign powers that were driven by 
their own vested interests.
343
  
The domestic criminal system of the states should be employed to 
punish reprehensible behavior carried out by non-state actors rather than 
inter-state use of force that has historically been reserved to deal with 
belligerent states. Such a course of action would strengthen and reinforce 
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the rule of law in the troubled state and also would lower inter-state 
conflict. There is no reason to believe that the ordinary criminal justice 
system of Pakistan is ill-equipped to handle crimes that are of a terrorist 
nature.  
From a global institution-building perspective, unilateralist behavior 
from powerful states to achieve their objectives while violating the 
territorial sovereignty of weaker states is extremely damaging to the 
interstate paradigm. Ascribing to multilateralism and peaceful modes of 
resolving disputes would force powerful state actors to develop other 
constructive modes of engagement for addressing matters that are more 
heavily focused on diplomacy, political dialogue, and compromise. Such 
an approach would also provide the necessary impetus for furthering the 
development and recognition of multilateral judicial institutions such as 
the International Criminal Court, which, when accorded the optimal level 
of authority and jurisdiction, would most appropriately adjudicate 
international crimes of a grave nature.
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